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“BAD COP” DIPLOMACY & PREEMPTION: AN 
ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLITICS GOVERNING WEAPONS 
PROLIFERATION 
INTRODUCTION 
October 4, 2002, North Korea nullifies the Agreed Framework 
not to develop nuclear weapons and admitted that it had been work-
ing on a nuclear weapons program since 1997;1 March 21, 2003, the 
United States invades Iraq partially on the rationale of preemptive 
self-defense, arguing such an invasion was necessary to stop Iraq from 
developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD);2 December 17, 
2003, Iran signs an agreement allowing intrusive inspections of its nu-
clear sites and says it is giving up its nuclear program after receiving 
international condemnation for its programs;3 December 19, 2003, 
Libya reaches an agreement with the United States and Great Britain 
to give up its WMD programs and allowing unfettered inspections.4  
With the first date, we see the questionable effectiveness of nuclear 
control regimes that are based on good faith; with the second, the 
United States for the first time used preemption as a mechanism to 
control WMD proliferation; and with the last two, we can see how 
compliance can be brought to bear by a reorientation of international 
regimes with a more outcome-oriented doctrine of preemptive self-
defense. 
 
 1. VICTOR D. CHA & DAVID C. KANG, NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA 132 (2003).  As this 
Note was being published North Korea admitted that it had nuclear weapons and that it would 
not participate in further multi-party negotiations.  James Brooke & David E. Sanger, North 
Korea Says They Hold Nuclear Arms, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A1.  This revolation makes 
the policies analyzed in this Note all the more pressing.   
 2. BBC News, Invasion Force Pushes into Iraq, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/ 
2872325.stm (Mar. 21, 2003) (last visited June 18, 2004). 
 3. Nazila Fathi, Iran to Sign Inspection Pact on Atomic Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at 
A24. 
 4. George W. Bush, Remarks of the President, Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Pro-
grams, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-9.html (last visited June 
19, 2004). 
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Nuclear weapons provide a unique vantage point by which one 
can examine the salience of international law in controlling state con-
duct.  International law often cannot be properly enforced against 
states who have a great deal of freedom to initiate actions in deroga-
tion of their international obligations and suffer no repercussions if 
the risk and cost of enforcement is too high.  This note copes with the 
question of how to fill the void traditional international law has faced 
in dealing with the threat of weapons proliferation. 
While the goal for this note could be considered overly ambitious 
and broad, it provides needed perspective at the current crossroads of 
nuclear policy.  In this note, I will first lay out the international politi-
cal theories that have been used in the past to address the threat 
posed by nuclear weapons, including deterrence, counterforce, and 
nonproliferation.  After looking at the underlying rationale for each 
of these theories, as well as criticisms of each, our analysis turns to the 
role international law has had in providing leadership and serving as a 
catalyst to end the use of nuclear weapons.  By looking at treaty law, 
customary law, as well as court decisions, it becomes clear that inter-
national law has taken the view that the use of nuclear weapons are 
almost always proscribed.5  While that topic may be relatively settled, 
what must be asked is whether international law’s determination is 
relevant when there are many divergent perspectives regarding the 
lawful use of force.  Third, this note will analyze the Bush administra-
tion’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
question whether its reliance on preemptive self-defense (the Bush 
Doctrine) will provide a better paradigm to limit the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.6  Fourth, this note provides a case-by-
case application of the Bush Doctrine to the factual realities of the 
war in Iraq, the conflict with North Korea, and the proposed settle-
ments with Libya and Iran to determine when preemptive self-
defense would be permissible and when it is actually practical.  Fifth, I 
will propose an alternative system where nonproliferation regimes 
teamed with preemptive self-defense can provide the necessary le-
gitimacy that is currently lacking under both the nuclear nonprolifera-
 
 5. See generally ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/ 
iunanframe.htm [hereinafter Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons] 
(last visited June 19, 2004). 
 6. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dec. 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf (last visited June 16, 
2004). 
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tion regime of the past several decades and the preemptive attack 
paradigm advocated by the current administration.  A discussion of 
these elements will provide a fuller understanding of the interaction 
between international politics, international law, and the current re-
alities of the nuclear threat. 
I.  INTERNATIONAL POLITICS PARADIGMS  
REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Numerous paradigms have been proposed to control the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons.  Any effort to grasp the current le-
gal realities must be grounded in an understanding of how nuclear 
weapons are perceived by states.  It is additionally important to look 
at the drawbacks to these perspectives because of their reemergence 
and integration under modern nuclear control doctrines.  While these 
perspectives may be considered entirely within the camp of interna-
tional politics or war strategy, they are key elements of opinio juris 
that will aid in evaluating the state action (or rather inaction) regard-
ing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons over the course of the 
Cold War. 
A. Deterrence 
Shortly after the United States’ first use of nuclear weapons in 
Japan, the Soviet Union joined the United States as a nuclear super-
power.7  The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion was based on the understanding that any activity by one actor 
would result in an act of retaliation, and likely complete destruction, 
by the other party.8  Nuclear deterrence is understood as “the threat 
of nuclear attack as retaliation, to prevent the opponent from using 
violence against the vital interests of the deterrer.”9  Thus, nuclear 
 
 7. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1997). 
 8. For a discussion on the effect of nuclear weapons of the relationship and actions of the 
United States and the Soviet Union, see John Mueller, The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear 
Weapons: Stability in a Postwar World, in THE COLD WAR AND AFTER: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 
43, 43–60 (Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds., 1993) (arguing that numerous factors 
such as a general fear of fighting any war was the key to the deterrence during the Cold War); 
Robert Jervis, The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment, in THE COLD WAR AND 
AFTER: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 70, 70–80 (Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds,. 1993) 
(arguing that nuclear weapons were the key to deterrence during the Cold War by looking at 
key events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and statements of Reagan and Gorbachev that “a 
war that cannot be won should never be fought”). 
 9. TOM SAUER, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 1 (1998). 
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weapons were not only thought of as an offensive weapon to be used 
in an effort to win a war, but rather primarily thought of as defensive 
measures to prevent war.10 
Yet nuclear deterrence is not something that exists automatically 
simply from the creation of nuclear weapons.  There are a number of 
key assumptions that nuclear deterrence theory is based upon: (1) the 
opponent is susceptible to deterrence (that meaning they are not irra-
tional, fundamentalists, or risk takers); (2) the opponent has vital in-
terests (limiting deterrence to state actors who have tangible, vital in-
terests); and (3) the threat of use of nuclear weapons is credible.11  
These three assumptions work ideally when there are two state actors 
who both have nuclear weapons, as was evident during the Cold War.  
In such a case, both actors know that any use of nuclear weapons on 
their part will almost assuredly result in retaliation such that there 
would be no realistic plan under which one could achieve victory.  
Even after disarmament from Cold War highs, the United States 
maintains 8,425 operational nuclear weapons and Russia maintains 
10,240 operational weapons.12  Deterrence appears to remain the posi-
tion at the center of nuclear arms control.13 
The popularity of deterrence theory has long been controversial 
and it has become even more so after the end of the Cold War.  The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Legality of Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons case opined that the problem underpinning deter-
rence is that in order for it to work people must be willing to use nu-
clear weapons freely to deter an attack.14  Second, as technology de-
velops to the point where nuclear weapons can be produced by non-
state actors such as terrorist groups, the principle of a limited multi-
polar system is clearly undermined.15  Additionally, these groups do 
not have “rational” or “vital interests” like those of state actors as 
 
 10. Id. at 1–2. 
 11. Id. at 3–10. 
 12. CHARLES J. MOXLEY, JR., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
POST COLD WAR WORLD 555 (2000). 
 13. SAUER, supra note 9, at 1. 
 14. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶ 48 
(“In order to be effective, the policy of deterrence, by which those States possessing or under 
the umbrella of nuclear weapons seek to discourage military aggression by demonstrating that it 
will serve no purpose, necessitates that the intention to use nuclear weapons be credible.”). 
 15. George Rathjens, Nuclear Proliferation Following the NPT Extension, in THE 
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 30–31 (Raju G.C. Thomas ed., 1998) (noting that the 
price of acquiring sufficient enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon has fallen from 
$400,000 in 1979 to a tenth of that today). 
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such groups often fight for a cause rather than the traditional rational 
goals typical of states.  Third, as state actors who have nuclear weap-
ons increase in number and heterogeneity, the ability to create an ef-
fective deterrence system lessens as many states will not be evenly 
matched as nuclear competitors, negating the underpinnings that all 
parties view the risk-reward calculus of using nuclear weapons virtu-
ally identically.16  Therefore, the assumptions upon which deterrence 
has been based have effectively been eroded.17 
Beyond the theoretical problems that face deterrence, there is 
fear of the secondary effects that result from a policy of deterrence.  
Among these are the fear that if weapons exist, they will eventually 
be used; that they will foster an arms race and nuclear proliferation; 
and they will provide risks for terrorism, human and equipment fail-
ure, and environmental concerns resulting from the long-term storage 
of existing weapons.18  These fears are compounded by the tangible 
monetary cost of maintaining a nuclear program that is never in-
tended to be used.19  With changes to the nuclear climate, the practi-
cality of deterrence has evolved to the point where many currently 
question its potency in rationalizing the continued existence of nu-
clear weapons.  However, as will be discussed later, the Bush admini-
stration has breathed new life into the deterrence doctrine as it is still 
seen as a reasonable way of explanation of the sixty year period 
where nuclear weapons have not been used. 
B. Nonproliferation & Counterproliferation 
After tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union 
reached a near boiling point, it became clear for all parties that meas-
ures needed to be implemented to control the spread of nuclear 
 
 16. Sumit Ganguly, Behind India’s Bomb: The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence, 
FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 135 (book review) (analyzing a system where states that have 
fledgling nuclear programs will conceptualize deterrence in a more real way to ward off any 
possible attack or threat to their interests). 
 17. The United States has admitted that groups like al-Qaeda were working toward and 
had plans for the development of nuclear weapons.  See Office of Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: 
Day 100 on the War on Terrorism: More Steps to Shut Down Terrorist Networks, The White 
House, Dec. 20, 2001, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01122004.htm (last visited June 
16, 2004). 
 18. MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 533–48. 
 19. David Silverberg, America’s Nuclear Arsenal: $5.5 Trillion Well-Spent, The Brookings 
Institute, July 8, 1998, at http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/silverberg.htm (noting the 
cost of maintaining nuclear weapons programs in a post Cold War era is $25 billion dollars a 
year and the overall cost of nuclear programs amounts to ten percent of the entire defense 
budget) (last visited June 16, 2004). 
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weapons.  This concern was embodied in the Treaty on the Nonprolif-
eration of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in which a plan to control nuclear 
weapons development was created.20  It is important to note that non-
proliferation is an international treaty obligation as well as an interna-
tional political conception for dealing with nuclear weapons.  This 
treaty also became central in the ICJ decision regarding nuclear 
weapons, discussed below. 
The treaty sets out a number of provisions addressing the spread 
of nuclear weapons.  First, the members undertake to not directly or 
indirectly pass nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices to other 
states.21  Second, it provides for safeguards for “non-weapon” states 
that do not seek such weapons.22  Third, all parties agree to pursue 
“good faith” negotiations to end the use of nuclear weapons and 
bring about eventual complete nuclear disarmament.23 
In 1995, the members of the NPT agreed to the indefinite exten-
sion of the agreement.24  This agreement has been lauded by many as 
the best possible avenue for eliminating the existence of nuclear 
weapons at some point in the future.25  It has served as the basis of the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, which have resulted in large re-
ductions in nuclear stockpiles.26  It has also provided the basis for nu-
 
 20. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968, art. I, available at 
http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf (last visited June 16, 2004). 
 21. Id. art. I.  While not a member of the NPT, the actions of Pakistan in providing weap-
ons technology to member countries has been troubling in recent news.  See William J. Broad et 
al., A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 
2004, at A1 (detailing the extent and means by which Pakistan spread weapons technology); 
David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Pakistani’s Nuclear Earnings: $100 Million, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 2004, at A12 (noting that clandestine sales of weapons to Libya alone netted Pakistan 
$100 million). 
 22. Id. art. II. 
 23. Id. art. VI. 
 24. Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Dec. 3, 1995, 
available at http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/1995dec3.htm (last visited June 16, 2004). 
 25. See generally, e.g., JOHN BURROUGHS, THE LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A GUIDE TO THE HISTORIC OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE (1998) (emphasizing the importance of the nonproliferation regimes at forcing nu-
clear states to negotiate the end of the use of nuclear weapons); Joseph F. Pilat & Charles W. 
Nakhleh, A Treaty Reborn? The NPT After Extension, in THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 
REGIME 41 (Raju G.C. Thomas ed., 1998) (opining with cautious optimism that the NPT will be 
able to control the spread and supplement counter-proliferation measures). 
 26. For more information regarding the status and details of these treaties, see Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency, http://www.dtra.mil/os/ops/nuclear/os_npt.html (last updated Jan. 9, 
2001) (last visited June 19, 2004). 
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clear states to help non-nuclear states remain nuclear free by provid-
ing economic incentives to remain so.27 
While remaining the primary regime dealing with the spread of 
nuclear weapons technology, nonproliferation has become increas-
ingly difficult to maintain and has essentially broken down because of 
the actions of several states.  Shortly after the extension of NPT, both 
India and Pakistan declared their nuclear capabilities.28  The discovery 
after the first Gulf War of nuclear weapons research in Iraq, in viola-
tion of its obligations under the NPT, fueled further concern about 
the realistic nature of any nonproliferation regime without stronger 
compliance mechanisms.29  The most recent and possibly damning 
event for the NPT regime is North Korea’s announcement that it is a 
nuclear state after years of concerted efforts to prevent Pyongyang 
from developing such weapons by providing numerous concessions.30  
Each of these events points to the key problem that has always ac-
companied the NPT regime—the lack of an enforcement mechanism.  
Because of the absence of this important element, good faith remains 
the basis for its enforcement, and as is evident in the recent develop-
ments in North Korea, good faith is woefully inadequate when a 
rogue state can more easily decide that attaining weapons of mass de-
struction is in its best interest.31 
The obligations of nuclear states to continue negotiations to re-
duce nuclear stockpiles have also stalled.  While more successful re-
cently, the United States and Russia have had a difficult time com-
pleting further bilateral negotiations to cut their nuclear stockpiles.32  
 
 27. A notable situation of this is the work of the United States and the Soviet Union in 
providing pressure in preventing India and Pakistan from getting nuclear technology for many 
years.  Additionally the difficulty in getting nuclear weapons technology after the NPT helped 
stop nuclear programs in Argentina and Brazil.  Rathjens, supra note 15, at 34.  It must be noted 
that India and Pakistan were not members of the NPT but this speaks to the competence of the 
regime to deal with critical states. 
 28. See Associated Press, Nuclear History in India Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1998, 
available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nuchist.htm (providing a timeline of the de-
velopment of nuclear weapons between India and Pakistan) (last visited June 19, 2004). 
 29. Rathjens, supra note 15, at 35. 
 30. Point of No Return, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 2003; see discussion infra beginning with 
note 130; Brooks and Sanger, supra note 1. 
 31. For a discussion of how to approach a heterogeneous state system regarding ambition 
on attaining nuclear weapons, see Rathjens, supra note 15, at 32–34. 
 32. While there have been agreements regarding the cuts in nuclear weapons numbers, 
other areas of nuclear technology (most notably ABM) have made weapons cuts unstable.  The 
slowness in cuts has been frustrating for non-nuclear states.  David E. Sanger, The Bush-Putin 
Summit: The Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at A1; Steven Lee Myers, Bush in First Step to 
Shrink Arsenal of U.S. Warheads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A1.  But see Ronald Timerbaev 
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The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABM), another component in the nonproliferation regime, in late 
2001.33  As the United States continues to take a more unilateralist 
view on the enforcement of what it sees as its rights and obligations 
under international law, the future viability of multilateral disarma-
ment is in much doubt. 
C. Counterforce 
The principle that a nuclear war can and should never be fought 
(the basis of deterrence theory) has been challenged by experts that 
feel nuclear weapons can be used effectively in certain circumstances 
and the United States must prepare to defend against the possibility 
of a limited nuclear attack.  This concept of limited nuclear war is 
known as counterforce. 
Counterforce has long been considered as one approach to the 
threat of nuclear weapons as well as when and in what matter such 
weapons can be used.  The United States and the Soviet Union both 
have at one point created counterforce scenarios outside of their basic 
deterrence strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction; however the 
original conception of the limited use of nuclear weapons was hard to 
call “limited.”34 
Yet as nuclear technology has developed so that the breadth of 
any nuclear impact can be limited, the United States has taken several 
steps to develop nuclear technology that would allow for a realistic 
counterforce initiative.  The United States’ understanding that nu-
clear weapons can be used in limited situations on small targets is evi-
dent from the development of weapons like the nuclear tipped, “bun-
ker busting” Trident bomb that can penetrate deep below the surface 
 
& Vladimir Orlov, Concerted Action Needed on Nonproliferation, THE MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 
19, 2000, available at http://www.pircenter.org/board/article.php3?artid=288 (noting distrust by 
the Russians over the status of nonproliferation agreements with the United States) (last visited 
June 16, 2004). 
 33. For more information regarding the debate surrounding the ABM debate, see John 
Newhouse, The Missile Defense Debate, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2001, at 97. 
 34. See MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 426–30 stating: 
Even under the most favorable assumptions it appeared that between 2 and 20 million 
Europeans would be killed, even from a very limited nuclear attack, with widespread 
damage to the economy of the affected area and a high risk of 100 million dead if the 
war escalated to attacks on cities. (US attack) 
The attack, while designed to inflict the maximum economic damage while minimizing 
the attack size, would have killed some 20 million Americans immediately and injured 
another 5 million . . . [with a]t worst a modest nuclear attack. . . induc[ing] a permanent 
collapse of the U.S. economy . . . . 
(Soviet attack) 
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to destroy targets underground that are unreachable with conven-
tional weaponry.35  The United States Defense Department states that 
such weaponry is necessary to fill a gap that exists in the ability to 
fight entrenched opponents.36 
A second way that counterforce has influenced United States nu-
clear policy is in the development of a missile defense mechanism, 
such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).37  Originally initiated 
by President Ronald Reagan in 1983, such a mechanism was believed 
to provide the United States with “something that would render [nu-
clear] weapons obsolete.”38  While critics contend that such a program 
will never work, the plan embodies the belief that Mutually Assured 
Destruction is an unsound theory for a country with other available 
defense options.39  While SDI and programs like it have been concep-
tualized in many different ways,40 it remains a key component of the 
United States strategy for addressing the nuclear threat.41 
Counterforce measures have been attacked on a number of lev-
els.  First, no matter how limited the initial use of nuclear weapons, 
there is a substantial fear of the escalation to a broader nuclear con-
flict.42  Additionally, with the changing nature of potential enemies 
and their means of attack, counterforce measures are likely unable to 
 
 35. See generally J.D. Crouch, Nuclear Posture Review: Hearing Before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/n01092002_ 
200201094.html (Jan. 9, 2002) (last visited June 19, 2004). 
 36. Id. 
 37. However, development of the new SDI system has suffered continual setbacks and 
there is concern that systems will be deployed before technology is adequately tested and devel-
oped.  See Bradley Graham, U.S. Missile Defense Test Fails, Dec. 16, 2004, at A5 (reporting re-
cent failures of missiles tests to intercept their targets). 
 38. Transcript of Reagan News Session on Social Security and Missile Defense, N.Y TIMES, 
Mar. 26, 1983, at A1. 
 39. See generally ELLIOTT L. MEYROWITZ, PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE 
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989) (stating the history and basis behind the devel-
opment of SDI). 
 40. For a complete timeline and history of United States missile defense programs, see 
Daniel Smith, Chronology of U.S. National Missile Defense Programs, at 
http://www.cdi.org/hotspots/issuebrief/ch9/index.html (last visited June 19, 2004). 
 41. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 6, at 3 (Dec. 
2002) (stating the need for a vigorous air defense and effective missile defense against today’s 
threats). 
 42. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-12 DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR 
OPERATIONS, I-5–I-6, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_12.pdf (Dec. 
15, 1995) (last visited June 19, 2004); MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 595–598 (providing numerous 
quotations from government officials, military experts, and academics opining that any sort of 
limited use of weapons will not be successful). 
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effectively address unconventional attacks, especially those from non-
state actors.43 
The above rationales governing the world since the first use of 
nuclear weapons provide insight into the numerous paradigms cur-
rently employed to manage the existence of nuclear weapons.  While 
these theories do not provide a specific single response to nuclear 
weapons and the threat of their use, they provide valuable context 
and an understanding of how states currently perceive the role of nu-
clear weapons.  This in turn aids in effectively analyzing whether the 
use or threat of use of such weapons is lawful and the significance of 
such a determination. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Treaties and customs that represent the collective views of the bel-
ligerents have been developed throughout history.  These principles 
protect combatants and noncombatants, safeguard human rights, 
and facilitate the restoration of peace.  These treaties and customs 
make up the law of armed conflict.44 
While international political theory provides several rationales 
both for and against the use of nuclear weapons, international law 
standards are also applicable.  It is important to remember that there 
are a number of applicable principles regarding the use or threat of 
use of nuclear weapons; however the scope of this note is limited to 
the humanitarian law principles of proportionality, necessity, and dis-
crimination.  This section provides an overview of each of these legal 
principles, along with an attempt to parse out how they apply to the 
nuclear threat and, ultimately, how nuclear weapons have affected 
the legitimacy of international law. 
Indeed, it is important to note that this is an area of international 
law where positive and customary law come together.  Humanitarian 
law is governed under the principle called the Martens Clause: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the high 
contracting Parties think it is right to declare that in cases not in-
cluded in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and bellig-
erents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of 
 
 43. James Dao, Defense Secretary Warns of Unconventional Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2001, at B5 (warning that terrorist groups could use nuclear dirty bombs to attack the United 
States). 
 44. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-12.1 DOCTRINE FOR JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR 
OPERATIONS, v, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/jp3_12_1.pdf (Feb. 
9, 1996) (last visited June 19, 2004) . 
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international law, as they result from the usages established be-
tween civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the re-
quirements of the public conscience.45 
For this reason and because of the necessary limited scope of this 
note, the principles that govern international law are going to be dis-
cussed at the same time in order to draw out their essential elements.  
Only after drawing out these principles will the difficult issue of cus-
tomary international law as applied to nuclear weapons be discussed.  
Additionally, because of the all- encompassing effect the use nuclear 
weapons would have, it is important to acknowledge up front that 
there is inherent overlap between these principles, which makes it dif-
ficult to parse them into discrete elements. 
A. Rule of Proportionality 
Principles of international law require that the use of force be 
generally proportionate to the threat that exists.46  In order to exam-
ine whether nuclear weapons can meet this principle, one must look 
at (1) the potential threats that could exist for a state contemplating 
the use of these weapons and (2) the amount of damage that would 
result from the use of the weapons. 
As was discussed in the first part of this note, there have been 
many different incarnations of the perceived threat that would allow 
the use of nuclear weapons.  However, when we get below the level of 
complete destruction of a state, it becomes harder to determine what 
other threats could allow the use of nuclear weapons.  Looking to his-
tory, the United States’ use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in the waning days of World War II was based on a fear that 
the war would drag on indefinitely and tens of thousands of Ameri-
cans and Japanese would die in an invasion of Japan.47  From this ra-
tionale, it would appear that the limited use of nuclear weapons for 
tactical purposes could be justified, but the single use of such weapons 
under this rationale makes it extremely difficult to establish a cus-
tomary norm of what qualifies as a proper threat. 
The second element proposed above considering the amount of 
damage the use of nuclear weapons would entail, once again forces 
one to look at the state of nuclear technology.  The United States, in 
its argument to the ICJ and in its actions in developing limited nu-
 
 45. Preamble, Hague Convention II (July 29, 1899) (emphasis added). 
 46. HISAKAZU FUJITA, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS, 33–37 (1988). 
 47. BURROUGHS, supra note 25, at 67; MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 26. 
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clear weapons, opines that current nuclear policies are built upon a 
false belief that nuclear weapons can only be used indiscriminately on 
a large-scale basis.48  If a country can limit the use of a nuclear device 
to a small area, the proportionality necessary for its use must be re-
calibrated to properly account for the weapons’ true effect.49  How-
ever, it is important to note the fear of escalation that can result from 
any use of nuclear weapons.  Additionally, the fallout that will result 
from their limited suggests such limited use may not fully conceive of 
possible inherent secondary dangers.50  Supporting this is the evidence 
of long-term environmental damage and disease surrounding nuclear 
blast sites such as at Bikini Atoll and in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
which were relatively low-yield nuclear weapons relative to the 
weapons of today.51  If the nature of the qualitative damage that re-
sults from nuclear weapons is too great, this element would likely 
overwhelm any justified use of such weapons. 
Tying these two aspects of proportionality together suggests a 
sliding scale that depends on the type of nuclear weapon used and the 
rationale for its use.  It will become increasingly difficult to judge 
proportionality as new limited weapons are developed, likely opening 
the door to new possible arguments for their use. 
B. Rule of Necessity52 
Nuclear weapons should only be used when conventional weap-
ons would not suffice in meeting the military objective in question, 
and any use of force beyond that would be illegal.53  The United 
States military specifically acknowledges that because of the direct 
and secondary fallout that would likely result from the use of nuclear 
weapons, their use would likely violate the rule of necessity.54  The 
principle of necessity is a long-standing doctrine that was used in ob-
 
 48. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶ 91. 
 49. FUJITA, supra note 46, at 40. 
 50. BURROUGHS, supra note 25, at 67. 
 51. MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 430–433 (acknowledging the problems that have resulted 
from the long-term affects of exposure to nuclear fallout include babies born without bones and 
transparent skin.  This has been noted in humans and other species as well). 
 52. Please note that there is a also a rule of moderation that applies to the use of force.  
The Hague Regulations Article 22 states that “the right of belligerent to adopt a means of injur-
ing the enemy is not unlimited.”  Encompassed in the discussion in this section of necessity is 
also the rule of moderation that force needs to be used in as limited a way as possible, and that 
going beyond such an means would be a violation of the rule of moderation. 
 53. MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 52. 
 54. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 44, at v–vi. 
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taining convictions in the Nuremberg and Yugoslavia tribunals.  Es-
sentially force that cannot be controlled may not legally be used.55  
Additionally, attached to this principle is the belief that soldiers are 
constrained in their behavior while fighting a war and that there will 
be repercussions for actions beyond those accepted as legitimately 
necessary.56 
When nuclear weapons are looked at through the lens of neces-
sity, some contend that their destructive capacity will always make 
their use illegitimate.57  However, these assertions do point to a key 
challenge for those advocating the use of nuclear weapons—any mili-
tary objective must survive the necessity requirement.58  If the use of 
the weapon can provide no benefit to the state employing them, it is 
very difficult to say that using such a weapon is necessary.59  As mili-
tary technology has developed and the use of nuclear technologies for 
limited purposes, such as penetrating underground targets unreach-
able with conventional weapons, the components of a legitimate lim-
ited military nuclear objective begin to emerge.60  The use of large-
scale missiles and the destruction that would result from their use is 
much harder to grasp under this principle.  It has been held that use 
of large-scale nuclear weapons would only be allowable to preserve 
the existence of the state, but others claim that even this limited cir-
cumstance is not permissible given the mass destruction that would 
result from large-scale nuclear engagements.61  For these reasons, the 
use of nuclear weapons under the necessity analysis is highly depend-
ent upon the surrounding facts and circumstances of the limited ca-
pacity of the weapon and the means of attacking the target in ques-
tion. 
 
 55. For a brief outline of the principle of necessity as applied in the Nuremberg Tribunals 
and International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, see Leif Tore Mickelson, Mili-
tary Ethics from the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and of the Former Yugosla-
via; a dissertation Proposal, available at http://www.accts.org/ethics/norway/michelst.htm (last 
visited June 20, 2004); MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 52. 
 56. See id. 
 57. BURROUGHS, supra note 25, at 96–97; MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 57. 
 58. MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 57. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Crouch, supra note 35. 
 61. See supra notes 34–43 and accompanying text for discussion on counterforce; the issue 
of the limited use of nuclear weapons was presented to the International Counter of Justice and 
is discussed infra. 
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C. Rule of Discrimination 
Elemental to the fighting of wars is the goal of destroying the 
opponent’s army.  Within this goal is the principle that the object of 
an attack should not be to attack civilians and to protect them to the 
extent practicable.62  Thus, the use of a weapon, despite being focused 
on a military target, that has a disproportionate impact on civilians 
would be considered improperly discriminatory under international 
law.  Indeed, Article 48 of the First Protocol to the Geneva Conven-
tions states: 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian popula-
tion and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and be-
tween the civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly 
shall direct their operations only against military objectives.63 
Some have tried to distinguish discrimination in the nuclear context in 
a way that does not entirely distinguish in a classic, absolute division 
between combatants and noncombatants.  The Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki bombings are used as examples for a more discretionary read-
ing of what discrimination should mean.  While many will simply at-
tack the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings as a violation of 
international law and end their argument,64 it would be disingenuous 
not to analyze these events further to see how they could further re-
fine a useful definition of the concept of discrimination in the nuclear 
context.  First, one must look at the legitimate interests of the state 
attacking.  In this case the United States contended that by attacking 
these two cities the war was shortened and the lives of many Ameri-
cans and Japanese were saved.  Additionally, some would argue that 
as long as the primary objectives of the attack are military in nature, 
widespread collateral damage will not deprive the use of force from 
being considered properly discriminatory.65  Even if opponents of this 
reading claim that the underlying facts of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki 
 
 62. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 343. 
 63. Id. at 347; however it is important to note on this point that the United States specifi-
cally provided that in its ratification of the First Protocol was subject to the understanding that 
“the rules established by this Protocol were not intended to have any effect on and do not regu-
late or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.”  Such reservations are permissible under the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties as long as they do not conflict with the object and pur-
pose of the treaty.  In this case because of other areas governed by the treaty this would appear 
to not be such a violation. 
 64. BURROUGHS, supra note 25, at 67. 
 65. FUJITA, supra note 46, at 35 (quoting ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE JUST WAR: A STUDY 
OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN DOCTRINE, 90–93 (1960)). 
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case are questionable,66 the underlying theory provides a powerful ba-
sis upon which discrimination can be understood to potentially allow 
for the use of nuclear weapons in limited circumstances. 
D. Application of the principles of international law to the use of 
nuclear weapons 
The International Court of Justice in 1996 provided an advisory 
opinion at the behest of the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
the United Nations General Assembly on the question, “[i]s the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under 
international law?”67  While the court dismissed the WHO as not be-
ing a proper body to put a question of this type before the court, it did 
proceed with the General Assembly request.68  While the court de-
cided several questions individually.  There are four that are impor-
tant to the overall discussion about when, or if, the use of nuclear 
weapons is ever permissible. 
1. No Customary or Treaty Rule Allowing the Authorization of 
Nuclear Weapons.  The ICJ stressed that “[t]here is in neither 
customary nor conventional international law any specific 
authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”69  The court in 
this case looked largely at the customary aspects regarding the 
authorization of the use of nuclear weapons.70  There are two 
components necessary for a customary rule to take root:  there must 
be state practice and opinio juris (intent on the parts of the states to 
support such as use).71 
Three elements are necessary for state practice to constitute a 
customary norm.  There must be (1) sufficient state practice, (2) by a 
specified number of states, (3) over a certain amount of time.72  The 
 
 66. BURROUGHS, supra note 25, at 67; MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 26. 
 67. Opinion on the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5. 
 68. The power of the court to decide this case comes from Article 65(1) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice which states “the Court may give an advisory opinion on any 
legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.” 
 69. Opinion on the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶ 105 . 
 70. While the Nonproliferation Treaty allowed for 5 states to retain nuclear weapons there 
is no treaty law to support the use of such obligations. 
 71. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States) (Merits), 
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); for a further explanation of customary international law see 
MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 39–48. 
 72. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 41. 
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calculus of whether there is sufficient state practice for a customary 
norm requires balancing these elements.  Regarding the use of nu-
clear weapons, it has been acknowledged that it is very difficult for a 
rule of customary international law to be acknowledged from a single 
instance of use.73  In the case of nuclear weapons, while the five major 
superpowers all have such weapons, and they have tested these 
weapons extensively, there is only one such instance of their use dur-
ing war.74  While one could stretch this principle and claim that the 
policy of developing these weapons is sufficient to allow their use, 
looking at the lack of such actual use over such a long period of time 
makes it equally difficult to claim that a customary rule allowing the 
use of nuclear weapons exists. 
The insufficient state practice that exists regarding the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons is reinforced by the mixed message surround-
ing their possession by the nuclear powers.  While the court took note 
that deterrence was the central policy undergirding the previous fifty 
years of nuclear policy, the court did not determine that such a policy 
should influence the creation of a customary rule that would allow for 
the use of nuclear weapons.75  Thus, the lack of intent behind any ac-
tions tied to the lack of state practice prevented a customary rule in 
favor of allowing the use of nuclear weapons.76 
 
 73. Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J 266, 277 (Nov. 20). 
 74. FUJITA, supra note 46. 
 75. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶ 
105.  But see Judge Shi (Appended Declaration), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunan_judgment_advisory%20opinion_19960708/iunan_ijudgment_a
dvisory%20opinion_19960708_Opinions/iunan_ijudgment_19960708_Declaration_Shi.htm (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2005) (noting disagreement over the use of political deterrence as a basis for 
opinio juris stating that this was international politics and should not be used in the determina-
tion of rules under international law). 
 76. This holding of the court was not controversial as it was unanimous. 
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2. No Customary or Treaty Rule Against Nuclear Weapons.  
There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any 
comprehensive and universal prohibition on the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons as such.77  A group of states argued before the court 
that both treaties and customary law were sufficient to prohibit the 
use of nuclear weapons in law, however, the court in the end 
determined, by a sizable majority, that no such law existed.78 
Under treaty obligations relating to other types of weapons, it is 
argued that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is prohibited.  Such 
groups pointed to The Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925 as either controlling in themselves or sufficient in 
their extension to create a customary rule that prohibits the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons.79  The 1925 Geneva Protocol was 
seen as most applicable.80  It was argued that the treaty’s prohibition 
against the distribution by projectile of poisonous or other gases 
should be seen as sufficiently analogous to the effects of nuclear 
weapons to prohibit their use.81  The ICJ, however, chose not apply 
these treaties, stating that under their plain meaning they could only 
cover weapons whose actual effect was to poison or asphyxiate and 
they were therefore inapplicable to nuclear weapons.82  The court, 
through this narrow construction, refused to consider these treaties as 
evidence of the prohibition of nuclear weapon use in customary in-
ternational law. 
Beyond these treaties, there is other evidence that opponents of 
nuclear weapons were able to use to support creation of a rule against 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons.  First, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly passed a resolution in 1961 stating that the use of nu-
 
 77. Id. at ¶ 105. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Roger S. Clark, Treaty and Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 171, 173 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & 
Philippe Sands eds., 1999). 
 80. Id. 
 81. MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 197. 
 82. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶ 54–
56. But see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunan_judgment_advisory%20opinion_19960708/iunan_ijudgment_a
dvisory%20opinion_19960708_Opinions/iunan_ijudgment_19960708_Dissenting_Shahabuddeen
.htm (arguing strenuously for the applicable of the rules of these conventions because of the 
fallout that results from nuclear weapons being tantamount to poisoning) (last visited June 19, 
2004). 
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clear weapons was illegal.83  General Assembly resolutions are not 
binding, but they can be considered as evidence of customary interna-
tional law.84  However, in this case, the number of states that voted for 
this resolution undermines its power as an ingredient of custom.  Only 
fifty-five states voted for the resolution while twenty states voted 
against.85  In this circumstance, the circumstances of the support for 
the resolution reduces its strength as illustrative of any international 
custom, as the resolution was motivated by narrow strategic concerns 
of the Soviet Union.86 
Opponents of nuclear weapons additionally tried to point to the 
lack of their use as evidence of a customary rule that such weapons 
were not allowed.  While the lack of an event can be evidence of state 
action, in this case there was no opinio juris to support a belief that 
states with nuclear weapons did not use them because they were ille-
gal.  The court specifically took notice, as touched upon in the previ-
ous section, of the importance that deterrence has played in the policy 
of nuclear states, and how this policy was grounded in the use of nu-
clear weapons in a massive retaliation against any possible attack.87  
Additionally, under the principle of the North Sea Continental Shelf 
case, the rationales of the nuclear powers would be essential in creat-
ing a customary rule against the use of nuclear weapons because they 
were the states that such a rule would most directly be applied; those 
states being in vocal opposition to the illegality of nuclear weapons 
once again undermines the creation of a customary norm against the 
proscription of nuclear weapons.88 
3. Limited Area for Debate.  It follows from the requirements 
discussed above that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would 
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in 
 
 83. Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons, 
G.A. Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess. (1961). 
 84. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 379. 
 85. Id. at 346. 
 86. Id.  This is because the main defensive line against the Soviets was highly dependent 
upon the nuclear deterrent that existed in Western Europe. 
 87. See supra notes 7–17 and accompanying text regarding the policy of deterrence; see also 
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5.  But see Judge 
Shi Declaration, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunan_judgment_advisory% 
20opinion_19960708/iunan_ijudgment_advisory%20opinion_19960708_Opinions/iunan_ijudgme
nt_19960708_Declaration_Shi.htm (believing that deterrence was a political question not subject 
to consideration by the court) (last visited June 20, 2004). 
 88. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). 
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armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law, however, in view of the current state of 
international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court 
did not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of 
self-defense, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.89 
In the most controversial aspect of its decision, the court stated 
that humanitarian law prohibited nuclear weapons use except in the 
case where the viability of the state was in jeopardy.90  Yet the court 
makes this broad assertion but does not provide guidance as to what 
“survival of the state” means.  The exception provides much difficulty 
in that if this means that states have a fundamental right to preserva-
tion, a broad reading would create an exception that would gut the 
norm stated in the first half of the holding.91  Additionally, under this 
broad reading, this fundamental right would potentially trump a 
state’s other obligations including any treaty limiting nuclear weap-
ons.92  This would, in essence, create an exception from international 
law when the state’s existence is threatened and would result in a de-
fault to deterrence being the guiding force in international law be-
cause the only thing that would keep states from killing their enemy 
would be the fear of one’s own certain demise.93 
However, a more limited reading of when a state can use nuclear 
weapons may be more appropriate in light of the surrounding lan-
guage used by the ICJ.  In laying out the principles of necessity and 
proportionality, the court was likely presenting an example of a lim-
ited case where a state may be able to meet the requirements laid out 
under humanitarian law rather than a right that would inure to the 
state.  This reading is more palatable since there is no precedent 
where an unlimited right of a state to its own preservation can be 
found in treaty or customary law.94  However, a right to some form of 
self-defense in the use of nuclear weapons and the lack of a clear 
definition of such a right represents the lack of certainty in this field 
 
 89. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶ 
105. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Marcello G. Kohen, The Notion of ‘State Survival’ in International Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
293, 294–95 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 298. 
 94. Id. at 306–10. 
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of international law as principles of the nuclear age are stretched to 
cover the realities of modern warfare. 
4. Need for Negotiations.  There exists an obligation to pursue 
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear 
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international 
control.95  The ICJ concluded their decision by reminding states of the 
obligation to continue with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.  
This holding of the court was designed to counter one of the main 
criticisms of bringing this case to the ICJ in the first place—a decision 
about the legality of the use of nuclear weapons would impede 
progress on treaty negotiations for nuclear disarmament.96  This can 
be read as an attempt to cajole the nuclear states to bring to fruition 
the end goal of nuclear disarmament, and that their right to maintain 
a stockpile of nuclear weapons is limited, based on their good faith 
efforts to eliminate them.97 
The court’s decision came down to the conclusion that nuclear 
weapons should seldom, if ever, be used and suggests that all states 
have an obligation to work together toward true nuclear disarma-
ment.  The decision marks a concerted effort to lay out with authority 
the position of international law on nuclear weapons; however, as is 
evident from this analysis, notable and evident gaps exist in interna-
tional law when humanitarian law provides the underlying principles 
for such principles.  This gap can be attributed to how humanitarian 
law has difficulty understanding how nuclear weapons operate within 
their unique framework.  Additionally, the lack of binding authority 
behind the ICJ decision underscores the weakness of the interna-
tional law and the nonproliferation principles the ICJ is asking all 
states to follow.  As a result, the ICJ decision, while arguably one of 
the highest and most authoritative decisions on the status of nuclear 
weapons under international law, remains an opinion. 
 
 95. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶ 
105. 
 96. MEYROWITZ, supra note 39, at 197–208. 
 97. See Miguel Marin Bosch, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Its Future, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 
375, 386–89 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999) (arguing that nu-
clear weapons states are not serious about nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and that a new 
paradigm is necessary to lead to true disarmament). 
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E. The American Backlash to International Law—The Death of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
The frustration with soft international law and the lack of an ef-
fective mechanism for the enforcement of obligations has not gone 
unnoticed in the world’s capitals.  Several examples point to the 
breakdown in nuclear weapons control regimes, a high profile exam-
ple among them was the United States Senate’s refusal to ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999.  While there are 
several reasons (including ones that are purely political) for the 
treaty’s demise, a shift in trust of international regimes on nuclear 
weapons was one of the driving forces behind its defeat.98  There was 
concern in the Senate of how the CTBT would operate.  First, there 
was deep suspicion over the science of high-tech virtual testing and its 
ability to maintain the readiness of U.S. nuclear capabilities.99  Sec-
ond, there was an overarching belief that other states that had signed 
the CTBT would not actually stop nuclear testing and that the 
CTBT’s monitoring and verification systems were insufficient to de-
tect cheating.100  Given these concerns, the CTBT not only failed to 
attain its required two-thirds majority but instead failed to achieve a 
bare majority.101 
The CTBT is more than simply illustrative of bad vote counting 
by Democrats in what amounted to a game of chicken between inter-
nationalists and unilateralists.  It represents a growing frustration with 
soft law principles to bind parties that provide no means of ensuring 
compliance by other members.  The CTBT vote also provides a pre-
view of the current Bush administration foreign policy characterized 
by the flexing of American muscle to force compliance on a more bi-
lateral level.102  The question that must then be asked is how well bi-
lateral threats can provide an effective tool for nuclear weapons man-
agement. 
 
 98. Terry L. Deibel, The Death of a Treaty, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 142, 144–45 
(providing an analysis on the reasons for the treaties defeat including a group of Senators who 
believed that international law cannot bring true security for the United States). 
 99. Id. at 144. 
 100. Id. at 145. 
 101. Id. at 142. 
 102. Id. at 161; G. John Ikenberry, American’s Imperial Ambition, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 
2002, at 45, 51. 
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III.  THE BUSH POLICY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
If the United States intends to rely on its strength to govern nu-
clear weapons proliferation, it will have to shift from the current 
framework of nonproliferation to a new regime that can provide sta-
bility but also provides some overarching basis that can bring to ac-
cord the hearts and minds of nuclear weapons states, those states not 
seeking nuclear weapons, and those states without nuclear weapons 
who may be seeking them.103 
A. Nuclear Theory a la Carte 
In December 2002 as a derivative of the new National Security 
Strategy, the Bush administration released the National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.104  The policy is heavily reliant 
upon an amalgamation of many different theories under the umbrella 
of a “new” concept of deterrence and counterproliferation.105 
The President’s plan is based largely on the opinion that new 
states should not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons and the 
United States should take measures to ensure such states comply with 
current nonproliferation controls.  The plan would take into account 
the tools of diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, export 
controls, and other elements to enforce international agreements that 
would limit the spread of nuclear weapons.106  The problem is that the 
United States emphasizes obligations of other states under the NPT 
but fails to account for its own obligations under the treaty.107  The 
Bush perspective is based on the assumption that nuclear weapons 
are here to stay and that the United States should reduce its stockpile 
only as is prudent, while developing new nuclear technologies (such 
as the Trident) for today’s modern enemy.108  The policy also pro-
motes the further development of nuclear missile defense technology, 
which has been evidenced in the United States withdrawal from the 
ABM treaty.109 
 
 103. George Perkovich, Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation, 
FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.drumbeat.mlaterz.net/Op-
Ed/George%20Perkovich%20Bush’s%20Nuclear%20Revolution%20030203a.htm (last visited 
June 20, 2004). 
 104. See supra note 6. 
 105. Id. at 1. 
 106. Id. at 2–3. 
 107. Perkovich, supra note 103, at 7. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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The Bush policy is based upon a fundamental shift in the under-
standing of the proper role of nuclear weapons and how they should 
be governed.  The weapons themselves are not seen as the problem—
the new focus is on the state and non-state actors who would seek to 
use those weapons (terrorists; rogue states; and potentially Pakistan, 
Russia, and China).110  Such a policy of allowing nuclear disarmament 
to be on what can be described as an a la carte basis not governed by a 
larger multilateral framework negates the benefit that non-nuclear 
nations realize from their NPT obligations and neglects the fact that 
there are states that may seek to join the nuclear club if such weapons 
will remain attainable in the distant future.111 
B. Preemptive Self-defense 
Another element within the Bush strategy regarding WMD is the 
concept of a preemptive attack to prevent other states from attaining 
nuclear weapons.112  Such a right of preemptive attack is extremely 
controversial.  A state is understood to have a right to use force to re-
pel an attack that is brought upon it.113  The imperative question here 
is how imminent must an attack be before a state can use force 
against that threat.  The U.N. Charter provides no explicit guidance 
on when force may be applied in such a situation.  While opponents 
argue that the language of Article 51 provides a mechanism to deal 
with threats to states under the first clause of Article 51 and Article 
2(4), a more liberal reading of the right of self-defense can be made 
by looking at the applicable language of the Charter in conjunction 
with the circumstances of its drafting.114 
The historic Caroline Doctrine states that preemptive hostile ac-
tion can only be used when an attack is “instant, overwhelming, leav-
ing no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.”115  The 
Caroline Doctrine, while a central concept in the use of force, should 
be questioned in its applicability to the nuclear weapons context since 
the Caroline was not touting a twenty-megaton nuclear weapon.  Be-
cause of the large threat inherent in such a weapon, a hard Caroline 
approach to nuclear weapons would force states to accept nuclear de-
 
 110. Id. at 5–6. 
 111. SAUER, supra note 9, at 31. 
 112. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 6, at 3. 
 113. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
 114. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 312. 
 115. Michael Elliott, Strike First, Explain Yourself Later, TIME, June 24, 2002, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/columnist/printout/0,8816,265536,00.html (last visited June 16, 2004). 
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velopment and would only allow action when the weapon was primed 
for attack.  The concept of necessity and immediacy in preventing an 
attack needs to be balanced with the amount of damage that will re-
sult from a state acquiring nuclear weapons and the inability to prop-
erly respond to a threat after a nuclear weapon’s development and 
deployment.  The statement by Vattel about the possibility of pre-
emptive self-defense should be looked at as a better articulation of 
the proper norm.116  When looking at what actions are permissible for 
a state to provide for its own security, Vattel opined that: 
It is safest to prevent the evil when it can be prevented.  A nation 
has a right to resist an injurious attempt, and to make use of force 
and every honourable expedient against whosoever is actually en-
gaged in opposition to her, and even to anticipate his machinations, 
observing, however, not to attack him upon vague and uncertain 
suspicions, lest she should incur the imputation of becoming herself 
an unjust aggressor.117 
This statement seems to correctly emphasize the harm component 
while properly requiring that a harm demonstrably exist before any 
such force could be used.  While this admittedly obfuscates the third 
step under the Caroline Doctrine, the legal requirement of exhaustion 
of deliberation has become less important and harder to apply when 
the goal is to prevent the development of nuclear weapons.118 
Preemptive self-defense does have its drawbacks and enjoys little 
historical support.  Until recently, it has been frowned upon by all 
major powers, including the United States.  The most notable exam-
ple of its disfavor was Israel’s bombing of the Osirak nuclear facility, 
which Israel claimed was going to be used to produce a nuclear 
weapon.119  The United Nations Security Council stated that the ac-
 
 116. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk II, ch. IV, § 50 (Joseph Chitty trans., 
1870), available at http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel_02.htm (last modified Oct. 21, 2002) 
(last visited June 16, 2004). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Thomas Graham, Jr., National Self-Defense, International Law, and Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, 4 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 1, 7–8 (2003) (noting that the condition of immediacy has 
been diminished when looking to threats that are less predictable and by state action); Angus 
Martyn, The Right of Self-Defense Under International law-The Response to Terrorist Attacks of 
11 September, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2001-02/02cib08.htm (Feb. 
12, 2002) (last visited June 16, 2004).  But see Kelly J. Malone, Comment, Preemptive Strikes and 
the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Legal and Political Limitations on the Use of Force, 12 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 807, 831–32 (2003) (noting that while exhaustion of peaceful remedies is not cited as 
much as other aspects of the Caroline Doctrine it is an important concept of international law 
reinforced by the U.N. Charter, and thereby applies it to the current North Korean Nuclear 
Crisis). 
 119. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 313. 
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tions of Israel were unjustified in the face of the threat that existed at 
that time.120  Beyond Osirak, there are situations where nuclear weap-
ons were placed in Europe by the United States and in Cuba by the 
Soviet Union; in both of these situations neither party used preemp-
tive self-defense to stop the actions of the opposing party.121  The 
question that cannot be answered and likely one of the main reasons 
the principle has not been applied until recently is the fear that it will 
be impossible to draw the line between when action would be justi-
fied and when it would be unjustified because it involves predicting 
future actions of other states, and this could introduce chaos into in-
ternational law and politics regarding the use of force.122  The bright 
line rule of keeping “bad” weapons out of the hands of “bad” people 
will not likely work in reality, as the nuclear club continues to grow.  
However, as discussed below, there are ways to distinguish between 
nuclear proliferators and one must do so in order to use this new doc-
trine of preemptive self-defense in a more practical setting. 
Regardless of what one thinks of the doctrine of preemptive self-
defense as a tool to ward off the threat of nations developing weapons 
of mass destruction, the doctrine appears to be here to stay, at least 
for the immediate future.  The attack on Iraq was largely based upon 
the belief that Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction develop-
ment programs needed to be stopped, as well as the claim that Hus-
sein’s regime was in breech of Iraq’s obligations not to develop such 
weapons.123  While the White House relied upon U.N. Security Coun-
cil resolutions 687 and 1441 as additional support for the invasion of 
Iraq, the entire context of these arguments was wrapped in the doc-
trine of preemptive self-defense.124  The doctrine, while under ques-
tion because of the inability to find WMD in Iraq,125 likely represents 
a strategic realignment where the United States critically looks to its 
own interests as justifying its action around the world. 
 
 120. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 22 Sess., 2288th mtg. at 10 (1981). 
 121. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 312. 
 122. Perkovich, supra note 103, at 8. 
 123. George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2003/03/20030315.html (Mar. 15, 2003) (last visited June 16, 2004). 
 124. George W. Bush, President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq in 48 Hours, avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html (Mar. 17, 2003) (last 
visited June 16, 2004). 
 125. Richard W. Stevenson, Head of Iraqi Arms Search May be Ready to Step Down, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at A15; see discussion infra note 205. 
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IV.  THE PRAGMATISM OF NUCLEAR  
PREEMPTION AS APPLIED 
Applying the doctrine of preemptive self-defense in theory is one 
thing, however, one must look critically at the places where such a 
doctrine would actually be used.  A number of authors, for and 
against preemptive action, have given lists of factors that should be 
considered as the sole basis of when nuclear preemption is permissi-
ble.  From these different analyses and having hindsight perspective 
to consider what factors have actually affected preemption, this note 
proposes four factors that should be used to judge the wisdom of us-
ing preemption in any given situation.  The factors by which preemp-
tion seems to turn are: (1) the imminence of the development of nu-
clear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction;126 (2) the threat 
a state perceives from outside its borders;127 (3) the ideological reason 
 
 126. This factor is a triggering mechanism, which the doctrine of preemptive self-defense is 
based.  Until a state has started some form of plans of weapons development, preemption is not 
applicable.  United States action in Iraq (discussed infra beginning with note 202 and accompa-
nying text) turns largely how far out this issue can go.  This element turns entirely on a temporal 
question of when states will develop nuclear weapons technology and leaves reasons for devel-
opment for a different analysis.  Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-defense, Inherence, 
and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 
552–53 (2002).  However, it should be noted that the imminence factor by some has said to be a 
two-sided determination, which allows preemption only up to the point where preemption is 
likely to cause large damage (whether from the use of the weapon or environmental damage 
from collateral radiation cause by the destruction of a facility).  David Sloss, Forcible Arms 
Control: Preemptive Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, 4 CHI J. OF INT’L L. 39, 48–49 (2003) (arguing 
that North Korea has gone beyond the point where preemption is an option because of their 
state of development). 
 127. This factor looks at what external threats possibly exist that cause a state to develop 
nuclear weapons.  This factor looks more at reasons for reactive development and use of nuclear 
weapons, which will more likely be done by states that have a negative outlook on their position 
and future in the overall global framework.  VICTOR D. CHA & DAVID C. KANG, supra note 1.  
Victor Cha provides a graph that helps understand how a states perspective on the world affects 
its actions: 
How do states Frame the Status Quo? 
 
Domain of Gains Neutral 
Domain of 
Losses 
Preemptive of Preventative 
Situation with Offense Having 
the Advantage 
Unlikely Likely Very High 
Preemptive or Preventative 
Situation with Defense Having 
the Advantage 
Very Unlikely Unlikely High 
Id. at 27.  As will be discussed with each state, the perspective a state has of its future will affect 
whether a threat of preemptive attack will be effective in stopping weapons proliferation. 
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for nuclear development;128 and (4) the state’s existing capacity to in-
flict destruction without weapons or mass destruction.129  One could 
argue that the prudence of using the doctrine of preemptive self-
defense could be varied by each situation; in order to understand the 
implications of this argument, these factors need to be applied to the 
states against which this doctrine would be applied. 
A. North Korea: Promises Broken (And a Nuclear Threat on the 
Horizon?) 
North Korea has been a complex adversary for United States 
foreign policy for the second half of the twentieth century.130  While 
the history of the United States-North Korea relationship relating to 
nuclear proliferation could be (and has actually become many times 
over131) a book in itself, its complexity can be (and must be for the 
purposes of this note) quickly summarized.  In 1994, the United 
States (under a special envoy lead by former President Jimmy Carter) 
entered into an agreement by which the United States agreed to pro-
vide benefits including a light water nuclear power plant to provide 
power for the North as well as certain security guarantees.  North Ko-
rea pledged to rejoin the NPT and allow inspections by the Interna-
 
 128. At the basis of international law is the belief that state actors are rational and have rea-
sons for their actions.  However, certain reasons for developing weapons are defensive and 
some are offensive in nature, differ in how strongly they are felt, and vary in how malleable they 
are to outside pressure.  “Rational state actors” and fundamentalists will react very differently 
when threatened with the use of force.  Louis Re e Beres, Israel, Iran, and Nuclear War: A Ju-
risprudential Assessment, 1 UCLA J. OF INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 65, 73–76 (1996). 
 129. Pragmatically for preemptive self-defense to be an option, it has to have some benefi-
cial effect in bringing stability to regional and world politics.  Thomas Graham, Jr., National 
Self-Defense, International Law, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 4 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 1, 8–9 
(2003); CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 55.  A state’s conventional forces and weapons need to 
be considered when any preemptive attack is considered because a preemptive attack can bring 
on a debilitating conventional weapons attack that will have similar evils to those sought to be 
stopped by the use of preemption.  See id.; see also discussion infra.  Cf. Beres, supra note 128 
(discussing the concept that “bee sting” attacks where one’s attack on an opponent brings one’s 
own demise are often ill-advised). 
 130. See, e.g., William M. Drennan, Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s Coercing 
Whom?, in THE UNITED STATES AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 157, 198 (Robert J. Art and Pat-
rick M. Cronin eds., 2003) (proving a full history of United States and North Korean interaction 
and noting several times that relations have broken down between the states in 1994 and several 
times since then). 
 131. See, e.g., CHA & KANG supra note 1; JOHN FEFFER, NORTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA: U. 
S. POLICY AT A TIME OF CRISIS (2003).  There are numerous books coming out as this conflict 
changes. 
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tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  To this point, neither party 
has fully complied with its obligations (the Agreed Framework).132 
In October 2002, the current North Korean crisis began when the 
North Korean government admitted to the United States it had con-
tinued to develop nuclear weapons in violation of the Agreed 
Framework and the NPT.133  While suspicions of the violations dated 
back to 1997, few expected that North Korea would fully admit the 
existence of the program when confronted. 
The United States demanded that North Korea comply with ex-
isting nonproliferation agreement obligations before any further talks 
could take place and suspended any deliveries of heating oil under 
the terms of the Agreed Framework.  The Koreans in response re-
moved seals from their facilities and expelled IAEA inspectors, re-
moved IAEA monitoring equipment, and withdrew from the NPT.134 
Many believe that preemptive use of force against North Korea 
is a non-issue, however, as talks with the North Koreans on prolifera-
tion issues have been unproductive and with North Korea appearing 
to continue its program of weapons development, the question of 
preemption has not been lightly dismissed.  As Donald Rumsfeld 
noted, “[w]e’re capable of winning decisively in one [Iraq] and swiftly 
defeating in the case of [North Korea]. . . .”135  What must be an-
swered is whether such a policy of threatening preemptive use of 
force or actual preemption is an effective remedy to the North’s ac-
tions or whether such a policy will actually degrade the strategic situa-
tion further. 
 
 132. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 137; Drennan, supra note 130, at 175—77. 
 133. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 130–32.  Leading up to this meeting with North Korea in 
October relations between the United States and the North Korea had been improving.  High-
level meetings had taken place between Secretary Powell and North Korean foreign minister 
Paik Nam-sen, construction at the United States funded light water reactor reached a new stage.  
Id.  Japan and North Korea had also reached a new level of improved relations as Japan apolo-
gized for its actions during World War II and Korea admitted and apologized for kidnapping 
Japanese nationals for espionage training and arranged for visits with their families in Japan.  
Id. at 131. 
 134. Id. at 133.  Other North Korean actions include resumption of missile tests, declaration 
of their nuclear weapons status, and plutonium reprocessing.  Id. 
 135. John Diamond & Dave Moniz, Gulf Buildup Limits Options on Korea, Officials Say, 
USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 2003, at A8, (quoting Secretary Rumsfeld).  But see Philip Zelikow, The 
Transformation of National Security, NAT INT., Spring 2003, at 24 (noting that administration 
officials tend to overplay the role of truth teller because of the license they tend to get for work-
ing for a “plain-spoken” president).  However, one may contend that subsequent events may 
have changed the Secretary’s assessment. 
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1. The Imminence of Development.  Of the states analyzed in 
this note, few would doubt that North Korea either has or is close to 
developing nuclear weapons.  It has additionally been proven that 
North Korea has developed the rocket technology to deliver such 
weapons over a great distance and has become a large exporter of 
ballistic missiles.136  North Korea has admitted that they have nuclear 
weapons with sufficient component materials to make a several addi-
tional weapons each year.137  The scope of North Korea’s weapons 
programs has notably grown as a result of Pakistan’s alleged assis-
tance of the North’s nuclear program in the form of centrifuge tech-
nology that can spin out uranium suitable for weapons.138  This is in 
addition to the Yongbyon plutonium extraction facility that initiated 
the current Korean crisis.  Additionally, North Korea has advanced 
means to test its weapons that impede the United States from being 
able to determine whether the North actually has an operational 
weapon.139  The fact that this program has been in development for 
many years and goes back to the early 1980s is proof that North Ko-
rea has sufficient means to be considered an imminent nuclear power. 
2. The Threat from Outside Force.  The Bush administration 
has been very sharp in the words it has used in dealing with North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons disclosures.140  North Korea’s concern over 
its inclusion in the Bush administration’s “Axis of Evil” is likely 
dwarfed by its concern over its perceived weakness relative to its 
 
 136. David E. Sanger, North Korea’s Bomb: Untested but Ready, CIA Concludes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at A8 (noting development activity has continued in North Korea and that 
when North Korea has a weapon it will not need to actually test the weapon to see to determine 
if it would work in an attack).  CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 33. 
 137. Over the course of two years year of working on this note, the evidence on whether 
North Korea currently has developed nuclear weapons has been both suggesting an affirmative 
and negative answer.  This is because North Korea has been able to develop more clandestine 
means by which they develop weapons and test them as well.  David E. Sanger, U.S. Widens 
View of Pakistan Link to Korean Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at A1 (providing the most 
recent assessment that a weapon nuclear weapon could be produced in the next one to two 
years, however, intelligence analysts stat that “it is a guess”).  As this note went to print, North 
Korea admitted they had nuclear weapons.  Brooke & Sanger, supra note 1. 
 138. David E. Sanger, U.S. Widens View of Pakistan Link to Korean Arms, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2004, at A1. 
 139. Associated Press, CIA: N. Korea Doesn’t Need Nuclear Tests, Nov. 9, 2003, available at 
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/11/8/184723.shtml (last visited June 20, 2004). 
 140. Even before North Korea’s announcement Bush had let it be known his dislike of the 
North Korean leader with his statement that “I loathe Kim Jong-il—I’ve got a visceral reaction 
to this guy. . . .” George W. Bush, Interview with Bob Woodward (Aug. 2002), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/11/17/60minutes/main529657.shtml (last visited Jan. 3, 
2005). 
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southern neighbor and competitor.  Exposing the North’s weaknesses 
provides some understanding of why it acts differently than most 
states when force is exerted on them.  Like a gambler on a losing 
streak, one who is losing will often act more desperate in what they 
will try to do to change the losing status quo.  One could argue that 
this applies on the state level, as well, as a state that finds time on its 
side and a bright future has an incentive to fall in line and modify its 
actions to the status quo when challenged.141  North Korea is in des-
perate straits.  While North Korea has proposed some programs to 
move forward in economic development aimed at garnering outside 
investment for its production and manufacturing capabilities, the de-
velopment of transportation systems with Russia, and the creation of 
the Rajin-Sonbong free trade zone,142 these have been sporadic ad-
vances in an overall losing war for stability.  North Korea has never 
enjoyed the economic success of its southern neighbor, but the col-
lapse of its patronage from the Soviet Union combined with Chinese 
ambivalence has caused the GNP of the North to slip from fifty per-
cent of the South to ten percent.143  In the post–September 11 world, 
North Korea has also found that U.S. priorities have shifted to Af-
ghanistan and Iraq.144  Shifts of influence compounded by years of 
failed crops and bad winters have created a domestic environment 
lacking stability.145  One of the few areas where North Korea has the 
edge is in conventional military forces of around 900,000 to 1.1 mil-
lion forces as opposed to around 600,000 in the South.146  However, a 
large military has been a mixed blessing for North Korea as it has fur-
ther taxed the North’s resources.147  This only exacerbates the horrible 
 
 141. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 28. 
 142. Id. at 33, 103–14. 
 143. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, North Korea (2003), available at 
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited Dec. 19, 2003). 
 144. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 77. 
 145. Id. 
 146. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 51; MICHAEL O’HANLON & MIKE MOCHIZUKI, CRISIS 
ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 64 (2003). 
 147. O’HANLON & MOCHIZUKI, supra note 146, at 65–66.  Military spending as part of the 
North Korean GDP compared to all other countries indicates that strain on its resources.  
Twenty-five percent of North Korea’s GDP is spent on defense.  Id. at 64.  That is compared to 
South Korea’s 3 percent of GDP and the United States’ 3.3 percent of GDP on defense.  Id.  
These numbers are even relatively high when one looks to the 2 percent of GDP commonly 
spent on defense in Europe.  ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER 25, 89 (2004) (look-
ing at the role economic growth has on a country’s ability to continue spending relatively large 
amounts of money on defense in a robust economy).  However, North Korea is exactly the op-
posite because relatively small amounts of money are spent on defense, but because of the its 
depressed economy defense spending amounts to 25 percent of GDP. 
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condition in the North as humanitarian aid is diverted to keep the 
military fed and supplied.148  North Korea is clearly in a “loss” per-
spective, thereby making it more likely to react negatively to coercive 
force threatened against it; North Korea will have an incentive to lash 
out when challenged because it has no stake in the current status 
quo,149 suggesting the doctrine of preemptive self-defense may be dis-
favored in this context. 
3. The Ideological Reason for Nuclear Development.  North 
Korea arguably has an incentive to develop nuclear weapons because 
of its loss-oriented perspective, described above.  In a broader sense, 
one has to look at how, when, and under which circumstances North 
Korea may actually use such weapons.  Most obvious to note is the 
fact that the Korean War has never officially ended, and the North’s 
stated goal of the destruction of the South has never been renounced.  
The North’s “theology” includes: (1) the North is the true representa-
tive of the Korean people and the puppet regime in the South is a 
threat to the Korean people, (2) the people of the South would wel-
come unity with the North but for the United States’ aggression and 
their puppet government, and (3) the North position is the morally 
correct one and will ultimately win on the peninsula.150  It is quite 
clear that the North is not working to force these issues, as it is hard 
to work for the fall of South Korea when one is trying to stave off 
one’s own collapse.151  However, North Korean actions likely will no 
longer follow the line of Kim Il-Sung’s pragmatic policy that “[w]e 
[the North] must wait and see what changes will bring about in the 
revolutionary situation in South Korea” as those in the leadership 
who remain loyal to revolutionary foundations as embodied in Kim 
Jong-Il.152  This fear is also emphasized with the erratic nature of Kim 
Jong-Il who remains unpredictable.   
4. The Conventional Capacity.  More than any other state ana-
lyzed here, North Korea has the best capacity to retaliate to a pre-
emptive use of force with existing conventional weaponry in a manner 
 
 148. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 50–51. 
 149. Id. at 29. 
 150. Id. at 82–83. 
 151. Id. at 83–84.  This pragmatic basis of action has a long history in North Korea as far as 
making some form of rapprochement with the South.  The Joint Communiqué between the 
North and South has been cited as built upon Northern hopes of alienating the United States 
and Japan. 
 152. Id. at 30. 
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to devastate its opponents.  General military estimates of a war on the 
Korean peninsula would include 50,000 U.S. casualties, 500,000 Re-
public of Korea military casualties, untold civilian casualties, potential 
devastation in the Asian economy and the possible destruction of 
Seoul—all within the first three months.153  North Korea maintains a 
sufficient conventional arsenal to destroy much of the industrialized 
South, and when destruction of this level can be unleashed in retalia-
tion for an initial attack, raising doubts about the efficacy of the doc-
trine of anticipatory self-defense as applied on the Korean Penin-
sula.154 
 
Conclusion: Preemptive self-defense is not the correct paradigm 
for dealing with North Korea.  Any efforts to constrain North Korea’s 
actions regarding the development or threatened use of a nuclear ar-
senal should rely on other tools as North Korea’s worldview, ability to 
respond conventionally with a credible and effective military strike 
and unpredictable leadership suggest that any such strike in self-
defense would cause greater instability.155 
B. Iran: the Danger of a Bipolar State 
Iran and the United States have what can be best termed as a 
“difficult relationship.”  The Islamic Republic of Iran, as set up in 
1979, has been known to support terrorism and Hezbollah with the 
purpose as furthering the “Islamic Revolution.”156  It has also sup-
ported external terrorist groups like Hamas in attacks in Israel.157  Al-
ternatively, Iran has been a society of change, as the Iran of Ayatollah 
Khomeini has become a much more multipolar state since his death 
 
 153. Drennan, supra note 130, at 191; O’HANLON & MOCHIZUKI, supra note 146, at 81 (not-
ing that even under a slightly more optimistic prediction of the ability to defend the South, it 
would still be bloody). 
 154. O’HANLON & MOCHIZUKI, supra note 146, at 81–82. 
 155. While some authors appear to consider preemption with North Korea to be a possible 
last option that is available, what is possibly workable theory is impractical in practice.  Cf. id. 
(holding that preemption would run the risk of a larger war and should be a near last alterna-
tive).  With the discovery in late 2003 that North Korea has clandestine centrifuge development 
facilities, even if the U.S. would want to preempt North Korea they would be limited by their 
ability to actually target the facility.  Unlike Yongbyon or Osirak, which were easily targeted 
reactor facilities, centrifuges can be hidden and makes preemption by means short of invasion 
even more difficult.  David E. Sanger, U.S. Widens View of Pakistan Link to Korean Arms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at A1. 
 156. Beres, supra note 128, at 72–74.  The terrorist actions of Iran are far too numerous and 
are a tangential issue to the larger issue of WMD proliferation. 
 157. Id. 
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in 1989, and different groups in Iranian society and the government 
have different visions of the future of the Islamic revolution.158  Firmly 
in charge of the military and most aspects of the government, includ-
ing the military and police, is Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Ali 
Hoseini-Khamenei.159  On the other side is the moderate president 
Mohammad Khatami, who was reelected in a landslide in 2001 with 
nearly eighty percent of the vote.  While Khatami’s control is small 
and relatively checked by the Ayatollahs, he has been able to grow in 
stature as the face of the moderate movement in Iran.160  This move-
ment of moderation suffered a large setback recently when parlia-
mentary elections in Iran moved hard liners into a much more com-
manding control of the government.161  Within this complex state, 
nuclear weapons development appears to remain a troubling issue as 
an Iran with nuclear weapons would be perceived by many as a dan-
ger to stability in the region. 
1. The Imminence of Development.  There are several different 
components of the Iranian weapons programs.  The main source of 
Iranian weapons in recent years has been Pakistan, China, North Ko-
rea, and Russia.  It is well known that Iranian rocketry currently al-
lows for the delivery of payloads over 1,500 kilometers.162  Iran has 
worked to develop (first with Russian aid and later with North Ko-
rean aid) longer-range weapons to give it a range of at least 1,300 
kilometers with the possibility of up to 4,000 kilometers.163  It is thus 
 
 158. Judith S. Yaphe, U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization in the Future?, STRATEGIC FORUM 
No. 188 (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF188/sf188.htm (last visited 
June 19, 2004). 
 159. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Iran (2003), available at 
http://www.odci/cia/publications/factbook (last visited Dec. 19, 2003); Reuel Marc Gerecht, Iran: 
Fundamentalism and Reform, in PRESENT DANGERS: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICAN 
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY 111 (Robert Kagan & William Kristol eds., 2000) (providing a 
discussion of the different personalities and roles in Iran). 
 160. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, IRAN’S MILITARY FORCES IN TRANSITION: A 
CONVENTIONAL THREAT AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 10–11 (1999) (noting the 
political jockeying that has been taking place since Khatami’s election including arrests of a 
number of officials that supported Khatami but additionally noting that Khatami has been able 
to get officials in office that support his moderate platforms). 
 161. Douglas Jehl, C.I.A. Says Elections in Iran Dealt Blow to Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 
2004, at A10. 
 162. CORDESMAN, supra note 160, at 66, 228. 
 163. Id. at 228 (there are a number of reports based on Israeli intelligence of missile pro-
grams in Israel).  Actual weapons development shows that a test in July 21, 1998 that a missile 
that was hoped to have a range of 1,240 kilometers exploded after going 620 miles; however, it is 
claimed that Iranian rocketry is fairly accurate.  Id. at 229. It is hoped that this rocket will give a 
range of 1,300 kilometers.  Iranian Missile a Regional Issue, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
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evident that Iran likely has sufficient delivery mechanisms to threaten 
much of the Middle East including Israel. 
Nuclear weapons development in Iran has been in progress for 
decades.  With the help of Russia and China, Iran has developed nu-
clear reactors and has an acknowledged nuclear energy program.164  In 
early 2003, the IAEA discovered that Iran had sufficient infrastruc-
ture that would allow it to have workable nuclear weapons by the end 
of the decade.165  The Iranian program at Natatz involved an under-
ground uranium enrichment facility equipped with centrifuges that 
could produce weapons grade plutonium.166  This process will allow 
for the production of two weapons per year when fully operational.167  
Thus it appears that Iran should be considered to be a state with 
prospects for nuclear weapons in the near future. 
2. The Threat from Outside Forces.  The United States has a 
long history of involvement in Iranian affairs whether it was the over-
throw of Mohammad Mosaddeq’s government in favor of the Shah in 
the early 1950s, the lack of support after being attacked by Iraq in the 
early 1980s, or being spurned for its actions in moving forces into 
neighboring countries during the Persian Gulf War.168  Saddam Hus-
sein’s Iraq was a danger to Iran, and his propensity to develop nuclear 
weapons was a substantial threat after he had shown that he was will-
ing to use chemical weapons on his neighbor in his invasion of Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq War.169  The threat from Iraq definitely changed 
after Iraq’s defeat during the Persian Gulf War; however, two modern 
threats drive the Iranian weapons program.  Israel’s presence in the 
 
tional Peace, at http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?NewsID=96 (July 24, 
2000) (last visited June 20, 2004).  Most notably, the distance between Israel and Iran is 1,300 
kilometers.  Id. 
 164. CORDESMAN, supra note 160, at 66. 
 165. Johanna McGeary et al., What Will Make Them Stop?: Carrots? Stocks? Inside Bush’s 
Diplomatic Struggle to Persuade Iran and North Korea to Give Up Their Nuke Programs, TIME, 
Nov. 3, 2003, at 36.  Israel claims that the development that Iran will have sufficient plutonium 
in two years to have a nuclear weapon.  Id. 
 166. Id.; Craig S. Smith, U.S. Softens Its Rebuke on Iran Nuclear Issue, Appeasing Allies, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at A5 (noting the recent concern over advanced designs for uranium 
enriching centrifuges that Iran failed to declared under an agreement reached in November 
2003 with the IAEA and traces of highly enriched uranium that has been discovered on some of 
the equipment in Iraq). 
 167. McGeary et al., supra note 165. 
 168. Gerecht, supra note 159, at 128. 
 169. CORDESMAN, supra note 160, at 337. 
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region is perceived by Iran as a threat to their existence,170 and Israel’s 
possession of WMD is viewed as a danger to all Islamic states in the 
region.171  Second, Iran’s strategic position between Russia, Iraq, and 
the Taliban has contributed to its longstanding security concerns, 
concerns which have been exacerbated by the perceived omnipresent 
power of the United States.172 This situation was made worse due to 
United States military initiatives over the last three years, in which 
the United States now effectively surrounds Iran—Afghanistan is un-
der the control of the American-backed Karzai government;173 while 
Iraq is led by an American-backed and financed government.  Thus, 
Iran feels threatened on many levels, which make the development of 
weapons of mass destruction an attractive path. 
However, when juxtaposed against the situation proposed in 
North Korea, Iranian concerns driving WMD development appear 
now to be rather defensive in nature rather than part of a larger plot 
for regional domination.  Iran has large oil reserves that if allowed to 
fully participate on the global level would stand to reap substantial 
economic benefits.174  Economically and politically, Iran has been in a 
state of flux but has remained stable as a state engaging in a fairly 
productive dialogue between moderates and conservatives.  Under 
the threat perception matrix presented above, Iran likely views its fu-
ture as at least neutral and is likely to have several opportunities for 
growth in the future.   
3. The Ideological Reason for Nuclear Development.  Iran is an 
ideological state.  From one perspective, this defines all Iranian ac-
tion.175  Traditionally, the Islamic government repressed those who 
taught religious tolerance and has pledged the destruction of the Is-
raeli state.176  These were the principles that undergirded Ayatollah 
 
 170. Israel is perceived as much as a threat for ideological reasons than as for any pragmatic 
reasons.  This will be discussed in the next section. 
 171. See generally Beres, supra note 128 (discussing the angst between Iran and Israel and 
noting that Israel may need to attack Iran if Iran continues development of weapons that could 
threaten Israel). 
 172. Gerecht, supra note 159, at 123–24. 
 173. See Amy Waldman & Carlotta Gall, A Young Afghan Dares to Mention the Unmen-
tionable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at A3 (discussing the ongoing development of the new gov-
ernment in Afghanistan and the problems with various warlords). 
 174. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Iran (2003), available at 
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited June 16, 2004). 
 175. See generally Beres, supra note 128 (viewing Iran as likely to attack regardless of its 
chances of victory in a war because of ideological reasons). 
 176. Id. 
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Khomeini’s revolution, and there is concern that external forces and 
practical limitations of power will not limit Iranian proliferation.177 
However, weapons development appears to be largely, if not en-
tirely, driven by pragmatic concerns about the region rather than 
revolutionary ambitions.  Iran, as was noted in the previous section, is 
largely driven by security concerns as it is surrounded by forces hos-
tile to its existence on all sides.  One additionally needs to look at 
military expenditures in Iran to see a practical reason weapons prolif-
eration is appealing when surrounded by opposing forces.  Military 
spending has been relatively small part of the Iranian GNP since the 
end of the Iran-Iraq war where it peaked at slightly more than 10 per-
cent of GNP and has since dropped to being only about 3 percent of 
GNP.178  This large drop in overall expenditures shows that military 
spending is not as large of a drain relative to other countries widely 
perceived as threats to the stability of the international system.  Much 
of the military focus of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been inward, 
aimed at ensuring the republic is not undermined by Iranians rather 
than by actions from the outside.  Because of this, we see a situation 
exactly the opposite of North Korea that is seeking nuclear weapons 
at least partially to allow it to cut back on its military spending.  Iran’s 
proliferation is likely driven by an attempt for long term cost savings 
as WMD (particularly nuclear weapons) would serve to create a cost 
effective deterrent as opposed to an expensive conventional force.  
This pragmatic concern is more typical for proliferating states where 
nuclear weapons are seen as an easy fix to credible deterrence.  
Threats of preemptive self-defense can be effective in tempering the 
tendency to follow the easy path of nuclear proliferation. 
4. The Conventional Capacity.  As was alluded to above, while 
Iran does have some military capacity, it is not such where it could 
threaten its neighbors effectively with current weapons technologies.  
Iran has a standing army of roughly 518,000, reserves of 350,000, 1,394 
 
 177. However, in rationalizing backing off nuclear proliferation, Iran cited ideological rea-
sons for choosing to give up the weapons program.  Ayatollah Khamenei stated nuclear weap-
ons were an un-Islamic weapon.  See generally Beres, supra note 128.  This perspective of gen-
eral ideological reasons for not developing weapons needs to be considered when one thinks 
that Iran will necessarily act for ideological reasons. 
 178. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Iran (2003), available at 
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited June 16, 2004); CORDESMAN, supra 
note 160, at 47. 
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tanks, 297 combat aircraft, 4 combat ships, and 3 submarines.179  Iran 
has been more effective in the development and purchase of mis-
siles;180 however, while one should not underestimate the Iranian mili-
tary, it is not sufficient in either size or tactical reach to counter a pre-
emptive attack that would inflict major damage.181  Thus, Iran’s 
current military forces are not developed in such a way to make a 
preemptive attack unpractical in the event that it was discovered that 
Iran was going to develop nuclear weapons and preemption was the 
chosen solution. 
Conclusion: Iran is a state that would likely be susceptible to a 
threat of preemption, given its relatively small conventional force, its 
long-term economic prospects, and its strategic concerns. 
C. Libya: surprises in admissions—questions in reasons 
On December 19, 2003, a surprise announcement came from the 
White House that Libya was seeking to join the international com-
munity again and was going to abandon its programs for weapons of 
mass destruction.182  It is still questionable how far along the Libyan 
weapons development had progressed or whether Qaddafi was just 
giving up on a program that did not have any hope of actually produc-
ing a weapon.183  However, in the announcement of the agreement 
with Libya, President Bush opined that the actions of the United 
States and its coalition in opposition to WMD (likely referring to the 
preemptive use of force in Iraq) was a major factor considered by 
Qaddafi in his decision to abandon his pursuit of nuclear weapons.184  
However, in order to see if Libya is a country that fits the United 
 
 179. CORDESMAN, supra note 160, at 66–94.  Interesting to note the practical problems Iran 
faces as a result of changing sources of military hardware.  Changing from Western, to Russian, 
and then to North Korean technology has caused a hodgepodge of different technologies that 
do not interpolate with each other.  This has caused problems for maintaining a coherent single 
military.  Id. 
 180. Id.  Iran has developed some moderate strike rocketry and has purchased a number of 
scud missiles from North Korea. 
 181. One should note that Iran does has a sufficient supply of chemical and biological weap-
ons that it could use in retaliation for an attack.  Id. 
 182. George W. Bush, Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs, at http://www.white 
house.gov/news/release/2003/12/20031219-9.html (Dec. 19, 2003) (last visited June 16, 2004). 
 183. Neil MacFarquhar, Libya’s ‘Brother Leader’ Pulls Another Rabbit from His Hat, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at A30. 
 184. George W. Bush, supra note 182.  The State Department also stated that Qaddafi felt 
the urgency to get rid of its weapons programs because of the American stances on Iran and 
North Korea and the war in Iraq, and a fear from militant elements in his own country. 
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States program of preemptive use of force, its profile needs to be ap-
plied to the preemption paradigm. 
1. The Imminence of Development.  In the past, Qaddafi’s 
Libya was notorious for its proliferation intentions.  Observers classi-
fied Libya as one of the most dangerous nations when it came to 
WMD proliferation including nuclear weapons.185  The Russians pro-
vided a general reactor to Libya in the 1980s; however it was gener-
ally believed that the nuclear program had been abandoned or ex-
tremely small until recent disclosures.186  Libya also had a stockpile of 
chemical weapons including World War I era mustard gas and addi-
tionally produced blister and nerve agents.187  On January 6, 2004, 
Libya signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and turned its 
chemical weapons programs over to international inspectors.188 
In its disclosures regarding its weapons program, Libya was 
shown to be more advanced in its programs than was initially 
thought.189  Most significant in the discoveries about the Libyan pro-
gram was their working centrifuges for nuclear enrichment.  Such 
centrifuges are necessary to make weapons-grade uranium.190  How-
ever, there were only a few centrifuges discovered and hundreds are 
necessary to make the qualities of enriched uranium necessary over a 
reasonable time.191  Additionally, the Libyans denied that any en-
riched uranium had been produced in those centrifuges.192  Regarding 
 
 185. Federation of American Scientists, WMD Around the World: Libya Special Weapons, 
at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/index.html (last visited June 20, 2004). 
 186. Id. 
 187. John J. Lumpkin, U.S.: Libya Eager to Dismantle Weapons, Associated Press (Dec. 19, 
2003), available at http://www.emjournal.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/a0053.html (last visited June 20, 
2004). 
 188. Judith Miller, Libya Discloses Production of 23 Tons of Mustard Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
6, 2004, at A5; Samia Amin, Recent Developments in Libya, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace at 
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Factsheets/developmentsinlibya.htm (Feb. 10, 
2004) (last visited June 19, 2004). 
 189. Patrick Tyler & James Risen, Secret Diplomacy Won Libyan Pledge on Arms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at A1 (showing the C.I.A. did have a some evidence regarding the Libyan 
WMD programs but did not know the full extent of the programs development); Peter Grier, 
From Iraq to Libya, U.S. Knew Little on Weapons, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 27, 
2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0127/p01s01-uspf/html (pointing to the lack of 
accurate information the United States had regarding Libya’s weapons of mass destruction pro-
gram). 
 190. Lumpkin, supra note 187. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
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delivery systems for possible weapons, Libya admitted having Scud-C 
ballistic missiles manufactured by North Korea that allow it to deliver 
payloads over 300 miles.193  These contraband materials, missiles, and 
supporting documents have been turned over to the United States.194  
Thus, while Libya did not appear to have an advanced weapons pro-
gram, it definitely had the potential and the intent to develop weap-
ons and was further along than the international community had real-
ized.  Under a relaxed viewing of imminent development, Libya could 
be so classified, however, it is more likely to classify Libya’s program 
as having distant potential not close to that of Iran or North Korea 
but, instead, more on the lines with what Iraq’s program was believed 
to be. 
2. The Threat from Outside Forces.  Libya has long seen the 
United States as a threat to its interests, however, the threat Libya 
perceived was often an outgrowth of its own actions.195  More recently 
Qaddafi has seen internal opposition grow to his thirty-year reign, 
which has for the most part been unquestioned, as nearly twenty 
years of economic sanctions have dealt a lasting economic blow to 
Libyan stability.196  While a number of countries have lifted their sanc-
tions against Libya after paying reparations for its terrorist actions, 
the United States retained its sanctions until the recent disclosures.197 
While Qaddafi has some concerns in opposition to his control, 
and the fact that the Libyan economy has had a relatively hard, slow 
transition to market level openness, there are several reasons that it 
should view its future in either a gain oriented or neutral perspec-
 
 193. Id.  These missiles are sufficient to threaten United States interests in the Mediterra-
nean region.  NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Interim Report, NMD, and Implications for the 
Alliance, at http://www.naa.be/archivedpub/comrep/2000/at-265-e.asp#6 (Nov. 2000) (last visited 
June 19, 2004). 
 194. Amin, supra note 188.  Overall 55,000 pounds of documents and components of Libya’s 
nuclear and ballistic programs have been provided as part of Libya’s disarmament agreement.  
Libya provided uranium hexaflouride, centrifuge parts, documentation, and guidance devices 
for long-range missiles.  Id. 
 195. Among the most notable actions was an air raid on a Qaddafi palace after it was 
blamed for an explosion in a Berlin discotheque that killed an American serviceman.  Libyan 
supported terrorists additionally supported bombings of commercial airliners over Lockerbie, 
Scotland and over Africa.  MacFarquhar, supra note 183. 
 196. Id.; Tyler & Risen, supra note 189 (noting the fact that after decades of economic sanc-
tions Libya is economically crippled and needs the return of the economic advantage from its 
rich oil reserves). 
 197. Id. 
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tive.198  Libya has oil reserves of nearly 30 billion barrels and further 
exploitation of those resources would allow it to add to its current oil 
production of 1.4 million barrels per day.199  This would allow Libya to 
finance its market transformation and theoretically stabilize the Qad-
dafi government.  For this reason alone, Libya, as can be deduced 
from their actions in December 2003, is prone to act favorably when it 
feels threatened by the even the remote possibility of a preemptive 
attack. 
3. The Ideological Reason for Nuclear Development.  Libya is 
not unlike Iran in theory.  While a de facto military dictatorship, 
many of its actions were based on Islamic principles.  The “old” Libya 
could be said to be a nation that acted entirely for ideological reasons, 
blind of the repercussions of its action.  Its support of worldwide ter-
rorism drove its entire foreign policy.  Qaddafi stated “I will do every-
thing in my power to divide the world into imperialists and freedom 
fighters.”200  However, old Libya is dead and from its ashes appears to 
be a “new” pragmatic Libya.  Qaddafi fears the loss of control that 
befell his contemporary, Saddam Hussein, and Libya needs American 
investment to shake off decades of economic sanctions.   
4. The Conventional Capacity.  Libya’s military ranks were 
composed of an estimated 90,000 solders in the 1980s, but the size of 
the Libyan military has continued to shrink.201  Its defense budget is 
1.3 billion dollars, being slightly less than 4 percent of GDP.202  It has a 
small air force of older Soviet aircraft, and a navy that is essentially 
the equivalent of a coast guard that is composed of six Soviet-built 
submarines.  As discussed above, Libya did maintain a moderate 
stockpile chemical weapons and moderate ballistic missile technol-
ogy.203  While Libya does have a working military, it is not so sizable 
to make preemption dangerous. 
 
 198. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Libya (2003), available at 
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited June 16, 2004). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Boaz Ganor, Survey of Arab Affairs- A Periodic Supplement to Jerusalem Let-
ter/Viewpoints, available at http://www.ict.org.il/articles/article3.htm (June 1, 1992) (last visited 
June 16, 2004). 
 201. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Libya (2003), available at 
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited June 16, 2004). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
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Conclusion: Libya is an example of the secondary effects that can 
be expected of preemption doctrine where a state that does not have 
fully developed weapons programs will potentially halt its programs 
upon noticing the peril of further development. 
D. Iraq—Reflections on Preemptive Force in Action 
As was addressed in the previous section, the attack on Iraq was 
largely built upon the belief that Iraq had to be stopped before they 
could develop WMD to attack its neighbors.204  Iraq has provided a 
harsh test for a new doctrine as evidence of actual WMD has been 
virtually non-existent causing critics of the policy to say it is unwork-
able.  While looking back at history benefits from hindsight,205 in this 
section, the four-factor analysis will again be applied as to the appro-
priateness of using preemptive use of force to deal with the perceived 
threat from Iraq with particular emphasis on the first point, immi-
nence.  Additionally, comparisons with the applications done with 
other states above will be done to provide a useful juxtaposition to 
when the doctrine should be applied. 
 
 204. George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2003/03/20030315.html (Mar. 15, 2003) (last visited June 16, 2004). 
 205. It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the larger issue of intelligence 
breakdowns that have taken place in Iraq.  Former U.N. weapons inspector David Kay noted in 
his statements about intelligence gaffs in Iraq that “[o]btaining accurate reads on enemy 
firepower is perhaps the most crucial challenge the nation is facing” and “[i]f the intelligence is 
correct, policy-makers have a better shot of doing the right thing.  If it isn’t, the resulting 
policies are likely to be flawed.”  George Gedda, Getting a Handle on Enemy Weapons is No 
Small Challenge, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 26, 2004, available at 
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/feb/26/yehey/opinion/20040226opi7.html (last visited 
June 20, 2004).  Former executive director of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and 
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), Hans Blix, has been concerned about the incorrect 
prediction of finding nuclear weapons in Iraq and provided some rationales of the mistake.  See 
HANS BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ 255–71 (2004).  If preemption is going to be used in the future, 
more resources will have to be dedicated to providing reliable intelligence on proliferation 
programs in rogue states that are working to activity hide such programs.  The practicalities of 
discovering weapons programs along with providing the needed legitimacy for preemptive 
action dictate that efforts on this front need to be redoubled.  See Joseph Kahn, North Korean 
Candor to be Central to New Nuclear Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004 (noting Chinese 
hesitance regarding the quality of U.S. intelligence with respect to secret North Korean 
weapons programs), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/24/international/asia/24CND-
KORE. html?pagewanted=1&ei=5070&en=e4ffed9eb8132ef1&ex=1087876800 (last visited June 
20, 2004).  But see Steven R. Weisman, Lasting Discord Clouds Talks on North Korean Nuclear 
Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004 (noting increased cooperation among the non-North Korean 
parties as a result of North Korea’s flippant behavior at the February joint meeting), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/14/international/asia/14NORT.html?ex=1394600400&en=54e1
2324d09a8d9f&ei=5007 (last visited June 20, 2004). 
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1. The Imminence of Development.  Iraq had tried to develop 
nuclear weapons in the past and had come relatively close to develop-
ing a nuclear weapon.  While it was questionable whether Iraq was 
developing nuclear weapons in early 2003, President Bush stated “in 
one year or five years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free na-
tions would be multiplied many times over.”206  The essence of this ar-
gument was that it would be foolish for the United States to wait until 
Iraq actually had nuclear weapons before it was ready to attack.  In-
deed, despite an apparent failure to produce conclusive proof of 
weapons program, the United States invaded based largely on what it 
believed was a secret nuclear, chemical and biological weapons pro-
gram as well as a connection to Al Qaeda.207  After Saddam’s forces 
were quickly defeated, the United States search for the WMD foot-
prints was unsuccessful.208  The Bush administration now works to 
stretch what would arguably be sufficient evidence to justify a pre-
emptive attack from actual weapons to any general WMD weapons 
program at any level of development209—essentially the rationale now 
used is to focus on Saddam Hussein’s intent and desire to develop 
WMD and not whether he actually had such weapons.210  However, 
stretching the self-defense doctrine to claim that early planning of a 
WMD program is sufficient to claim a right of preemptive self-
defense is likely an abuse of the doctrine and is unnecessary.  One 
must remember cases where states have started nuclear weapons pro-
grams, only to abandon them after a change of heart—the recent 
Libya solution is instructive in that regard.  The Iraq situation appears 
fundamentally different than the current situation in Iran and North 
Korea, where weapons programs have progressed further down the 
 
 206. George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq, Mar. 17, 2003, n.39 Weekly Comp. 
Pres Doc 338, 340 (Mar. 24, 2003), available at http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp 
?Page=%5C%5CNation%5C%5Carchive%5C%5C200303%5C%5CNAT20030317g.html (last 
visited June 19, 2004). 
 207. Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
599, 603 (2003). 
 208. Richard W. Stevenson, Head of Iraqi Arms Search May be Ready to Step Down, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at A15. 
 209. Id.  President Bush has tried to recharacterize what was necessary for preemptive force 
to be appropriate.  In an interview when asked him if evidence would be found of actual weap-
ons or only weapons programs, he answered “So, what’s the difference?”  Id. 
 210. Stevenson, supra note 208.  The United States does have evidence, as has been con-
firmed by Dr. Kay, that the Iraqis’ had programs to develop various WMD; however, Kay stated 
that he would need as much as nine months before being able confirm or deny the existence of 
actual weapons. 
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road to development and the information regarding such develop-
ment appears considerably more concrete. 
2. The Threat from Outside Forces, the Ideological Reason for 
Nuclear Development, and the Conventional Capacity.  The basis of 
the Iraqi weapons programs was likely a tool to provide Iraq a degree 
of legitimacy and means of checking United States actions in and 
around the Persian Gulf.  Iraq serves an ideal example of a state seek-
ing to exert clout in the region, however, the fact that Iraq did not ac-
tually possess WMD made its bargaining position weaker than what it 
could have hoped with such weapons.  Iraq also serves as the perfect 
example of a totalitarian state that sees WMD as the magic potion to 
counter perceived American aggression.  Iraq had not been able to 
use the airspace over a majority of its country for years because of no-
fly zones that had been set up and had been subject to regular attacks 
by American forces patrolling the region.  Iraq provides a lesson that 
one proliferates at its own risk.   
Conclusion:  Iraq is an example of preemption pushed to its limit.  
Preemptive action was likely unwarranted as Iraq’s alleged WMD 
program had not been developed as extensively as initially thought.  
Further, because Iraq’s military and infrastructure had been eroded 
by a decade of low-level war and economic sanctions following the 
Persian Gulf War, Iraq’s ability to produce a credible conventional 
response to any U.S. preemptive aggression was not credible. 
V.  CONTEXTUALIZING THE INCONSISTENCY—
RETHINKING NONPROLIFERATION 
The United States’ policy of preemptive self-defense has been 
widely regarded as irresponsible and unnecessarily unilateral—with 
detractors claiming it will ultimately lead to a much more dangerous, 
unstable world.211  Yet the monster of preemptive self-defense can and 
should be tamed, and integrated with the treaty obligations that cur-
rently exist under the NPT.212  As has been discussed in this note, the 
NPT has provided a means of potentially eliminating the world of nu-
clear weapons by stemming the spread of weapons to states not cur-
rently part of the nuclear club.213  Yet, the NPT is not a panacea—
 
 211. Madeline K. Albright, Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2003, at 
2. 
 212. Perkovich, supra note 103, at 3. 
 213. See discussion supra notes 21–23. 
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critics are justifiably concerned about a tool that in essence relies on 
“good faith” and constrained by suspect enforcement mechanisms, 
especially when the stakes are so high.214  Additionally, the willingness 
to threaten preemptive self-defense has arguably proven to produce 
positive results in Libya, along with potentially positive developments 
in Iran.  Yet amputating nuclear disarmament from international le-
gal principles, as the Bush Doctrine would do, has the potential to 
produce great confusion and effectively removes the long-term carrot 
that existed behind NPT—the eventuality of a nuclear free world.215 
A. Preemption Is a Legitimate Tool 
The United States is the world’s sole superpower, and its power 
must be realized as a reality in the current international climate.  The 
Bush administration should take this opportunity to strengthen multi-
lateral nonproliferation by moving toward multilateral nuclear disar-
mament, however the United States should have the right to condi-
tion such disarmament upon other states doing the same.216  Under 
such a system, a violation of obligations must amount to more than 
short-term economic sanctions. 
It is also questionable how far the United States is willing to push 
the doctrine of preemptive self-defense to enforce nonproliferation 
financial resources, political capital, and the pragmatic difficulties of 
retaining networks of information will likely be stretched to their 
limit.217  However, the United States has set a bold precedent in its 
 
 214. See discussion supra notes 96–99. 
 215. See discussion supra notes 21–23. 
 216. Philip Zelikow, supra note 135, at 25 (noting that “the administration prefers interna-
tional institutions that judge performance and stress accountability rather than those that main-
tain a detached neutrality in order to preserve a friendly consensus”). 
 217. One need only consider the critique by many that are concerned over the focus on 
WMD that has affected the United States’ ability to seek out al Qaeda as states in the Middle 
East are concerned with the intentions of the United States.  See Albright, supra note 211; Ste-
phen Zunes, The Archipelago of “Evil”—Middle East, in POWER TRIP: U.S. UNILATERALISM 
AND GLOBAL STRATEGY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 117, 129–36 (John Feffer ed., 2003) (stating 
that United States multilateralism have caused several problem for the United States operations 
in the Middle East).  Indeed, it is difficult for the United States to focus simply on weapons pro-
liferation when other foreign policy goals in combating terrorism as one if its main allies in that 
war, Pakistan, has proven to be one of the prime suppliers of weapons technology to Iran, North 
Korea and Libya.  David E. Sanger, U.S. Widens View of Pakistan Link to Korean Arms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at A1 (noting the Bush Administration has not pushed Pakistan on the 
proliferation because of the search for Osama bin Laden); Kamran Khan, Pakistanis Exploited 
Nuclear Network, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2004, at A1 (noting the extent to which Pakistan was 
providing resources to Iran and Libya and that Pakistan’s leaders were not providing oversight 
over its nuclear weapons programs). 
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dealings with Iraq that can and should be employed credibly in its ne-
gotiations with Iran and North Korea.  While this does not necessarily 
mean threatening invasion, as doing so would not necessarily be ef-
fective (as is discussed above with North Korea) promoting an envi-
ronment where one is punished for seeking to join the nuclear club 
instead of getting the proverbial gift basket of security guarantees, oil 
and food supplies is necessary if nonproliferation is to have any long-
term chance of success. 
B. Multilateralism is Not Inconsistent with Preemption 
Multilateral relations cannot always be civilized—given the po-
tential security benefits to states currently in pursuit of WMD, a will-
ingness to use military action to enforce the stated purpose of NPT 
regime is necessary.  While other states may not approve of the use of 
the preemptive attacks, Iran is an example of the threat of such action 
providing a “good cop-bad cop” dynamic where other states have ef-
fectively been able to get Iran to cease its weapons proliferation ac-
tivities and engage in dialogue.218  Those states and organizations that 
have negotiated these concessions with Iran cannot be so blind as to 
think that the settlement was entirely in spite of United States action 
in Iraq.219  Whether they think the attack on Iraq was necessary, it is 
hard to argue that preemption has not added a necessary credible en-
forcement dimension to NPT obligations.220 
 
 218. While the analogy to the “good cop-bad cop” rational can become strained if relied on 
too much, it is clear the United States has teetered on a line between multilateral action in Iran 
and North Korea while at the same time being more unilateral with Iraq.  See, e.g., BBC News, 
E.U. Draft Iran Nuclear Timetable, Nov. 22, 2004, at 
www.newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps.pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ (last visited Jan 3, 
2005); Craig S. Smith, U.S. Softens Its Rebuke on Iran Nuclear Issue, Appeasing Allies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at A1 (noting the United States’ continued approach of standing down 
and allowing diplomatic measures to be used in Iran); Weisman, supra note 205 (noting the on-
going talks with North Korea). 
 219. The complexities of the United States role with the rest of the world community has 
been a topic of much discussion and numerous books are available that take various different 
stances on the proper way the United States should act and the way the other countries should 
respond to the United States.  See generally, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 147 (proving the most pro-
nounced statement as to the inevitable differences between the United States and Europe in 
what problems each seeks to address and by what means they will address those problems); 
BENJAMIN R. BARBER, FEAR’S EMPIRE: WAR, TERRORISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) (provid-
ing a criticism of the Bush Doctrine and stating the need for more liberal, multilateral action). 
 220. However, I do concede that preemptive use of force may have the effect of pushing 
proliferation underground and will add an additional burden to intelligence resources as addi-
tional funding and ingenuity will be necessary to ferret out these WMD programs before they 
develop to a point. 
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Preemption is a tool in the nonproliferation toolbox—it should in 
no way be the first and only tool to be used.  Looking at the Bush 
Doctrine itself, it is important to note that preemption is not the only 
mechanism to address weapons proliferation.221  From the Bush ad-
ministration’s first presentations of its doctrine of preemptive self-
defense, one must remember that it was one pillar within the overall 
game-plan to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction.222  
Multilateral regimes (through the NPT and IAEA), deterrence, coun-
terproliferation, preemption, and any other tools available need to be 
fully exploited in a seamless, unified effort, and all parties in the fight 
against WMD proliferation need to understand that no single element 
is the “correct” one that must be used all the time.223 
Preemption will likely be counterproductive and dangerous if not 
applied in some consistent way and accepted as a legitimate tool of 
nonproliferation—this means the United States needs to move be-
yond the rhetoric that has accompanied its preemptive actions to this 
date.  An overambitious enforcement regime characterized solely by 
preemption will have the effect of making the United States the 
world’s policeman, a role that it has feared and loathed undertaking, 
leaving other states insecure about their role in international affairs.224  
Additionally, in order for this preemption to ever have any chance of 
acceptance after the diplomatic debacle in Iraq, the United States will 
have to be willing to allow multilateral input on the intricacies of any 
such a plan.  Yet in a current environment where unilateral action is 
chic, the tolerance for such a framework is questionable.  However, 
like in any “good cop-bad cop” plan, the “bad cop” needs to under-
stand the game only can go so far.  The United States has proven in 
Iraq that it is not bluffing when it proposes preemption, but that does 
 
 221. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 6, at 2. 
 222. Id. at 5 (noting that all aspects of the policy, including multilateralism, intelligence 
gathering, and preemption, need to be integrated). 
 223. As is noted, the United States, while a hegemon, cannot rely on it military strength 
alone to stop weapons that can be hidden with ease given modern technology.  Remember the 
“Model T” of nuclear weapons could be transported in an airplane and as the events of the last 
year have proven, no single means of controlling nuclear proliferation can be successful.  See 
Zelikow, supra note 135, at 19 (noting that multilateralism is key in stating that “[w]e must 
speak of American power and of responsible ways to wield it; let us stop talking of American 
empire, for there is and there will be no such thing”). 
 224. It has been generally acknowledged that United States is the primary enforcer of inter-
national law and international norms as it is the only country that has the potential to quickly 
and easily interdict in world conflict.  KAGAN, supra note 147, at 46–47 (analyzing the Balkan 
War of 1999 as an example of the United States being the only country that could easily move 
forces into an area where Europe should have been able to mobilize with ease). 
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not mean that the preemption card needs to be played every time the 
state fits the paradigm discussed above.225  Additionally, it is not ac-
ceptable for the United States to simply allow others to be involved in 
multilateral efforts.226  While there are certain places where other 
states should take the lead in diplomacy, the apparent need to drag 
the United States to the table in certain situations (like Iran and 
North Korea) hurts the United States ability to capitalize on the 
strength and conviction it has shown on the issue of WMD prolifera-
tion.227  Other states must also not take a simple view that preemption 
is the only tool the United States is willing to use as it has proven with 
its acceptance of multilateral dialogue and diplomatic mechanisms in 
Iran, North Korea, and Libya. 
The current situation in North Korea presents a true testing 
ground for the full Bush nonproliferation framework including possi-
ble preemption, and whether it will help or hurt the environment for 
bringing about an effective settlement to North Korea’s nuclear 
brinksmanship.  While Donald Rumsfeld has stated that military ac-
tion in North Korea is on the table, preemptive use of force, while an 
effective tool, can only be brought to bear when it will be effective in 
producing compliance with NPT regimes and will not unleash devas-
tating attacks in itself.  While it is practical to realize that Iraq and 
North Korea are not the same state and have different propensities, a 
 
 225. Indeed, the administration has stated that preemption is the last alternative that should 
be followed, and that preemption is to be considered only in grave circumstances.  Zelikow, su-
pra note 135, at 27.  National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice specifically noted the limited 
circumstance when preemption can be used: 
[Preemption] must be treated with great caution.  The number of cases in which it 
might be justified will always be small.  It does not give a green light—to the United 
States or any other nation—to act first without exhausting other means, including di-
plomacy.  Preemptive action does not come at the beginning of a long chain of effort.  
The threat must be very grave.  And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of 
action. 
Condoleezza Rice, Wriston Lecture (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html (last visited June 16, 2004).  When preemption is used in 
a situation where alternative means are available, the doctrine loses any sense of morality that 
could possibly accompany it (and morality is likely necessary if such a doctrine has the potential 
to be legitimately accepted under international law). 
 226. At the same time, the United States can see the benefit from other states exploiting 
contacts to these rogue states.  Russia was instrumental in getting an agreement with Iran to al-
low unfettered inspection because of its conditioning additional nuclear fuel on Iran allowing 
inspections.  Fathi, supra note 3. 
 227. Parisa Hafezi, Iran Says EU Nuclear, Trade Talk Going Well, REUTERS, Jan. 16, 2004, 
at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews.newsdesk/L16611732.htm (noting positive negotiations with 
between the European Union and Iran, however, European leaders say United States support 
and approval is necessary). 
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dangerous precedent will be created if North Korea is given a pass 
sending the message that the key to developing weapons is to get far 
enough in their WMD development through cheating and blaming 
others for blatant violations of important NPT obligations.   
CONCLUSION 
Paradigms to deal with nuclear weapons management need to 
adapt with a changing world rife with new threats.  This note pro-
poses integrating the Bush concept of preemptive self-defense with 
the preexisting NPT regime as a more effective, no-tolerance mecha-
nism for dealing with nuclear weapons.  Such a policy will involve the 
United States making a viable long-term commitments to interna-
tional treaty obligations relating to nonproliferation and disarma-
ment, continuously engaging allies and the major players in nonpro-
liferation initiatives while maintaining the credible threat of 
preemption discussed above.  As nuclear technology becomes easier 
to attain by rogue states and dangerous non-state actors, the United 
States will have to win over the hearts and minds of states and organi-
zations if such a doctrine of nonproliferation with teeth will work to 
create a safer, nuclear-free world rather than a situation where the 
United States is isolated from the world community. 
Blake Klein* 
 
*The author would like to thank Professor Scott Silliman for his insight during revisions to this 
note. 
